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This dissertation comprises a series of three essays that relate advances made 
to both theoretical and empirical issues in marketing.  
 The first essay discusses the issue of endogeneity of market share and price in 
logit models and provides a theoretical procedure to solve this problem. The 
inseparability of demand and price make the possibility of drawing definite 
conclusions about either almost impossible. We employ a recently rediscovered 
mathematical function called the ‘LambertW’ to solve this problem of endogeneity 
and in turn yield logit models more conducive to theoretical study. We also employ 
this methodology to the problem studied by Basuroy and Nguyen (1998).  
 The second essay deals with the issue of pricing implicit bundling. Implicit 
bundles are products that are sold separately but provide an enhanced level of 
satisfaction if purchased together. We develop a model that would account for the 
possible relationships of the products across the different product lines. We show that 
  
accounting for these relationships would decrease the amount of price competition in 
the market and also allow the Firm to enjoy higher profits. We also account for the 
endogeneity of price and market share when deriving the optimal solutions. We show 
that optimal prices first increase as the relationship between the firm’s two products 
become stronger and then decrease as the two products become more exclusive to 
each other. Finally, we also find that a firm’s prices increase as the competitor’s 
contingent valuations increase.  
The third essay helps improve the efficacy of CRM interventions by analyzing 
the latent psychological loyalty states of the customer. We use state space models to 
predict these latent loyalty states using observed data. We then use the predicted 
values of loyalty to derive the probability of repurchase of the customer. We also 
identify the types of CRM interventions that play a role in improving the loyalty of 
the customer to the firm and those interventions that have no effect. We compare our 
model’s predictions to those derived from two other estimation methods. We find that 










ADVANCES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN MARKETING 












Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Roland T. Rust, Chair 
Professor Brian T. Ratchford 
Professor P. K. Kannan 
Professor Wendy Moe 












































I am indebted to Dr. Roland Rust for his constant help and guidance towards 
the completion of this dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Brian Ratchford for his 
unconditional support and guidance.  
I would also like to thank Dr. P. K. Kannan, Dr. Wendy Moe and Dr. Roger 








Table of Contents......................................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. vi 
Overview....................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Essay 1 - The LambertW Transformation As An Approach To Solving 
Share Equations In Logit Models ................................................................................. 5 
Summary................................................................................................................... 5 
1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 5 
2. A Brief Note on the ‘LambertW’ Function........................................................... 6 
3. The Logit Model ................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Consumer’s Demand Function ....................................................................... 9 
3.2 Firm’s Profit Function................................................................................... 11 
4. The Analytical Solution ...................................................................................... 11 
4.1 Solving the Firm Level Endogeneity Problem.............................................. 11 
4.2 Estimation Procedures .................................................................................. 14 
5. A More General Application Incorporating Marketing Expenditure ................. 15 
6.  Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 2: Essay 2 - Pricing Related Products In A Competitive Environment – The 
Role Of Contingent Valuations Between Products..................................................... 20 
Summary................................................................................................................. 20 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................... 20 
2. Literature Review................................................................................................ 22 
2.1 Product Relationships ................................................................................... 22 
2.2 Complementary Pricing ................................................................................ 27 
3. Model Formulation ............................................................................................. 29 
3.1 Defining the Market Structure ...................................................................... 29 
3.2 Consumer Demand Formulation................................................................... 31 
3.3 Manufacturer’s Profit Function..................................................................... 37 
3.4 Consumer Surplus......................................................................................... 46 
4.  Conclusion And  Managerial Implications ........................................................ 48 
5. Future Research .................................................................................................. 54 
Chapter 3: Essay 3 - Modeling Loyalty For Better Customer Relationship 
Management................................................................................................................ 55 
Summary................................................................................................................. 55 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................... 56 
2. CRM Models....................................................................................................... 59 
3. Model Development............................................................................................ 63 
3.1 Modeling the Customer’s Probability of Purchase ....................................... 67 
3.2 Modeling Loyalty Transitions....................................................................... 72 
4. Data and Estimation Procedure........................................................................... 74 




5.1 The Loyalty Equation ................................................................................... 78 
5.2 The Repurchase Equation ............................................................................. 81 
5.3 Model Validation .......................................................................................... 83 
6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 86 
Appendices.................................................................................................................. 90 






List of Tables 
 
Chapter 3: Essay 3 - Modeling Loyalty For Better Customer Relationship 
Management  
  
 Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics – Mean and Standard Deviation     77 
 Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics – Frequency              78 
 Table 2:   Model Parameter Estimates              82 
 Table 3: Model Comparison Table – Comparing the Predictive  
  Ability of the State Space Model with the Hidden  










List of Figures 
Chapter 1: Essay 1 - The LambertW Transformation As An Approach To Solving 
Share Equations In Logit Models 
 
 Figure 1 – The LambertW Function       7 
 Figure 2 – Relationship between market share of firm ‘i’ and price of           
       firm ‘k’                                                                                            12 
 Figure 3 – Relationship between the price of firm ‘i’ and price of                  
       firm ‘k’                                                                                            13 
 Figure 4 – The decrease in  P1* with increase in P2     18 
 
Chapter 2: Essay 2 - Pricing Related Products In A Competitive Environment – The 
Role Of Contingent Valuations Between Products 
 
Figure 5 – The Market Structure                         30 
 Figure 6 – Variation of PA1 with respect to η1                                                44 
 Figure 7 – Variation of PA1 with respect to η2                                                45 
 Figure 8 – Variation of PA1 with respect to η1 and η2                                      46 
Figure 9 – The Consumer Surplus        47 
 
Chapter 3: Essay 3 - Modeling Loyalty For Better Customer Relationship 
Management  
 
Figure 10 – The standard State Space Model                        67 
Figure 11 – Population-wide distribution of the individual means                  





My dissertation consists of three essays. All three essays detail and develop 
new methodologies that can be used by researchers to better understand the market.  
In ‘Essay 1’ and ‘Essay 2’ I develop a new methodology to solve the issue of 
endogeneity of price and market share in logit models. Endogeneity in logit models 
prevent meaningful interpretation of marketing dynamics when data for the particular 
phenomenon or situation is absent. Hence in Essay 1 we solve this problem by 
developing a procedure that explicitly separates the price and demand variables by 
utilizing a special class of functions called the LambertW. The LambertW function 
helps solve several complex equations that involve either exponential or logarithmic 
functions. Using this procedure we analytically solve the endogeneity problem 
between price and demand in logit models. We do so without the need for 
instrumental variables that would otherwise have been used. We also show the ease 
with which these functions can be adapted to different simulation and estimation 
procedures. Finally this procedure is validated by employing it to explicitly derive the 
results obtained by the Basuroy and Ngyuen (1998). 
Essay 2 adds to the dissertation by applying the procedure developed in Essay 
1 to study a new problem. We study the market for implicit bundles. Implicit bundles 
refer to the group of products that are sold separately (also referred to as pure 
components) but could be perceived by the consumer as products that would provide 
an enhanced level of satisfaction if purchased together. In many cases, the implicit 
bundles are sold by the same firm, in the form of products sold across different 




bundles. We do so by developing a model that would account for the possible 
relationships, also known as contingent valuations, of the products across the 
different product lines. The degree of contingency determines the strength of the 
relationship between the two products. If the contingency level is zero then the 
products are independent. As the level increases the relationship between the products 
increases, thereby increasing the exclusivity between the products.  We show that 
accounting for these relationships would decrease the amount of price competition in 
the market and also allow the firm to enjoy higher profits, because it would be able to 
charge the consumer for the additional surplus gained by purchasing both products 
from the same Firm. We also account for the endogeneity of price and market share 
when deriving the optimal solutions. 
The analysis carried out in this essay helps us establish the following results: 
1. The prices of the products of a firm (X) increase with increase in the 
contingent valuation of the products manufactured by the same firm (X). 
However if the contingent valuation is increased beyond a particular value, 
then the prices of firm (X) decrease with increase in the relationship. Hence 
the relationship between prices and the contingent valuation is initially 
monotonically increasing and then monotonically decreasing. 
2.  The prices of the products of the firm (X) increase with increase in the 




3. Firm X experiences a higher profit for the same market share, when its 
products are priced considering the contingent valuations than when they are 
priced independently of each other. 
Consumers who purchase the products would have a lower level of consumer 
surplus if the contingent valuation is recognized by a firm. 
CRM (Customer Relationship Management) interventions like direct mailings 
have long been used by firms to improve customer relationships. In the third essay we 
develop a method that will allow the firm to understand the effect of these 
interventions for customer loyalty. Loyalty is assumed to be unobserved and hence is 
modeled as a latent variable. We use a generalization of the ‘Hidden Markov Model’ 
(HMM) called the ‘State Space Model’ (SSM) to better predict a customer’s loyalty 
function towards a particular firm or product. The SSM models are structurally 
different from HMM models and they offer three main advantages over HMM 
models. First they are continuous and are described across all possible relationship 
states of the customer, hence we avoid the problem of explicitly choosing the number 
of states; second, they can be used to model an infinite number of relationship states; 
and third they are better at modeling recursive behavior, which is necessary when 
modeling customer behavior that involves the effect of experience. We also predict 
the customer’s probability of purchase given certain marketing actions and the 
predicted loyalty state using a hazard model. We combine the hazard model and the 
SSM to predict the customer’s probability of purchase at a given loyalty state. We 
apply this model to data from a retailer of health and beauty aids, in order to help 




loyalty towards the firm and their repurchase intentions. We also point out the types 
of CRM interventions that play a role in improving the loyalty of the customer to the 
firm and those interventions that have no effect. This information can hence help the 
firm better organize its menu of CRM interventions. We can also compute the 
probability distributions across the loyalty states for each individual customer, thus 
providing the researcher with knowledge of each customer’s loyalty state. Finally we 
introduce a new methodology to the literature on modeling relationships in marketing. 
The methodology improves upon existing methods by allowing for a more flexible 
and efficient estimation procedure. We also compare our model’s predictions to those 
derived from two other estimation methods. We find that the predictions derived from 





Chapter 1: Essay 1 - The LambertW Transformation As An 
Approach To Solving Share Equations In Logit Models 
 
Summary 
 Logit models allow the expression of individual demand and supply 
equations. However, closed-form solutions for equilibrium shares and prices are 
highly nonlinear and cannot readily be derived. This hinders the employment of logit 
models in theoretical studies, and also makes it difficult to develop reduced-form 
expressions for share and price as a function of exogenous variables for use in 
empirical studies. In this paper we propose that a recently rediscovered mathematical 
function called the ‘LambertW’ be employed in solving logit models for equilibrium 
shares and prices. We demonstrate this methodology on the problem studied by 
Basuroy and Nguyen (1998). 
 
1. Introduction 
Discrete choice models have been extensively used in both the marketing and 
economics literature to study various aspects of consumer behavior using data on 
market share, price and other variables that affect demand. Logit models are widely 
used in the empirical literature (Abramson, Andrews, Currim and Jones 2000; 
Kamakura and Russell 1989; Guadagni and Little 1983; McFadden 1978). However, 




variables of interest. Some exceptions include Basuroy and Nguyen (1998), Carpenter 
and Lehmann (1985), Lillien and Kotler (1983) and Lillien and Ruzdic (1982). The 
complexity of the resultant expressions is often attributed to be the cause of this non-
usage (Gruca, Kumar and Sudharshan 1992; Gruca and Sudharsdhan 1991; Karnani 
1985).  
 In this paper, we propose that a recently rediscovered mathematical function 
(first studied by Euler 1779), termed ‘LambertW’, be employed in obtaining 
equilibrium solutions for share and price in logit models. Traditionally, the 
LambertW function has been used to solve several exponential equations (Corless, et 
al. 1996). The rest of the paper is organized as follows— in §2, we provide a brief 
overview of the ‘LambertW’ function. We develop the standard logit model in §3, 
and in §4 we present the solution and simplify the model for estimation purposes. We 
provide a theoretical application of this methodology in §5. We provide our final 
conclusions in §6. 
2. A Brief Note on the ‘LambertW’ Function 
LambertW is the inverse function associated with the equation, 
                                      xWWe =                                                                  (1). 
The LambertW function belongs to the family of exponential and logarithmic 
functions. The function given in (1) resembles the exponential function and the 
inverse of this function resembles the logarithmic function. Hence, the shape of the 
LambertW function closely follows that of shape of the exponential function and the 
logarithmic function. The LambertW function differs from the exponential to the left 








= − . Similarly, the LambertW function differs from the 
logarithmic function for values of x ≤ 0 as while the logarithmic function is not 









−  and 0. In this case, W(x) has not just a single valued function but has two 





= −  and W(x) ≥ -1. W0(x) is also referred to as the principal branch of the 
LambertW function. The other branch satisfying W(x) ≤ -1 is denoted by W-1(x). The 
shape of the LambertW function is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 






At this point, let us examine and question the importance of the LambertW 
function. Similar to the exponential, logarithmic and square root functions, the 
LambertW is helpful in solving a series of previously unsolvable equations (readers 
may refer Corless, et al. 1996 for an illustration). The LambertW function has already 
seen widespread application in the fields of physics (Warburton and Wang 2004; 
Valluri, Jeffrey and Corless 2000) and applied mathematics (Corless, Jeffrey and 
Knuth 1997, Jeffrey, Hare and Corless 1996, Jeffrey, et al. 1995). Hence, there has 
been a movement to include the LambertW function in the core set of elementary 
functions that are used to solve equations (Hayes 2005, FOCUS 2000).  Many 
equations involving exponentials can be solved using the LambertW function. 
 In this paper, our primary interest is to employ the LambertW function to 
solve a previously analytically unsolvable simultaneous equations problem. Before 
we proceed with our study, we will briefly outline a few important properties of the 
LambertW function. For a more detailed exposition on the properties of the 
LambertW function, the reader is advised to refer Corless, et al. (1996). 

















)( ,                                                                                 (2) 
where n! is a factorial. This series however oscillates for values of x ≥ 0.4 and hence 
cannot always be used for practical numerical computation. However, there exists an 
asymptotic formulation, that is convergent for all x, which yields reasonably accurate 













































































,                                                                                                                                 (3a) 
where L1 = ln(x) and L2 = ln(ln(x)). 
A further simplification of this formulation, namely, 
04.0)1ln()]1ln(0195.01[665.0)( ++++≈ xxxW ,                                                                            (3b)  
provides an accurate approximation to the LambertW function and is used primarily 
for numerical estimation purposes. 














=  and                                                                 (4) 
 the anti-derivative of W(x) is, 
 ∫ ++−= CxWxWxdxxW ])(
1
1)([)( .                                                                                (5) 
 Also W(0)=0 and W’(0) =1. 
Finally the logarithm of W(x) is given by, 
  log(W(x)) = log(x)-W(x)                                                                               (6) 
3. The Logit Model 
3.1 Consumer’s Demand Function 
 We consider the simplified scenario with two firms, namely firm i and firm k. 
Each of these firms sells a product. The products sold by these firms compete for 
market share. Let product i denote the product manufactured by firm i and product k 
denote the product manufactured by firm k. We conduct our analysis with respect to 




As the aim of this paper is to develop techniques to analytically solve discrete choice 
problems, we proceed to define the probability of a consumer choosing a particular 
firm’s product, i.e. we model the consumer’s demand for each brand. If a consumer 
purchases product i then the utility to the consumer from the purchase is:  
                                  jiijiiiiji UPu εεββ +=+−= 0 ,                                                (7) 
where uji is the utility obtained by consumer j from product i, β0i is the brand or 
product specific parameter, βi is the price response parameter for product i, Pi is the 
price of i, Ui is the deterministic component of utility that is assumed to be constant 
across consumers, and jiε  is the random error term.  
We wish to compute the share of i relative to the competing brand k and an 
outside good that represents non-purchase in the focal category. The utility of the 
outside good is normalized to 0; i.e. we assume U0 = 0. Given that error terms for i, k 
and 0  follow an iid type 1 extreme value distribution, the choice share for i with 
respect to the outside product  option, and with respect to the competitor k’s product 












,                                                           (8) 
where Si is the probability of choosing product i. The elasticities of demand for firm i 
with respect to the prices charged by firm i (own price) and firm k (competitor’s 
price) are:   











































3.2 Firm’s Profit Function 
 The firms in the market are price setters. Let Ci be the marginal cost incurred 
by the firm to provide product i. Hence, the firm’s profit from selling product i is: 
                               ( ) iiii SCP −=π ,                                                                         (10) 
where iπ  is the profit firm i earns from selling the product at price Pi. Assuming the 
existence of a pure strategy interior equilibrium, the price vector satisfies the first 
order conditions. Hence differentiating (10) with respect to Pi, and setting the result 
as equivalent to zero, we derive the optimal price that the firm must charge so as to 
maximize profit as: 















   ,                                                            (11) 
where *iP  is the optimal price charged by the firm. This optimal price is a function of 
share, which, in turn, is a function of price.  
4. The Analytical Solution 
4.1 Solving the Firm Level Endogeneity Problem 
In equilibrium, equations (8) and (11) must hold simultaneously. The solution 
to these simultaneous equations is highly nonlinear, and does not readily admit to a 
closed form solution. However, a closed-form solution can be provided in terms of 
the LambertW transformation. As demonstrated in the appendix, the following 
equations for price and share can be derived: 








































































.                                         (13)  
 This solution allows the price equation to be expressed in a form that allows 
the effects of market share and price to be separated. Hence the LambertW 
transformation allows us to rewrite the equation for market share and price in a 
manner in which they are independent of each other. Initially the market share of firm 
i was an integral part of the price equation (see equation 11) and hence we could not 
make any predictions about the price that the firm charges. Hence, through the 
LambertW transformation we can eliminate the econometric endogeneity problem 
that exists between Pi and Si. The solution also allows for reduced-form expressions 
for price and share, which allows direct determination of changes in optimal price 
resulting from changes are made to the cost, other independent variables, or the 
competitor’s price. For example if we assume that the prices of the competitors are 
given, then figures (2) and (3) show the variation of the market share of firm i (Si) and 







Figure 2: Relationship between market share of firm i and price of firm ‘k’ 
Market Share 
of firm i: Si 





Figure 2 describes the market share increase for firm ‘i’ when firm ‘k’ 
increases its prices. Figure 3 shows the amount by which firm i can increase its price 
when firm k increases its price, if firm i intends to retain the same level of market 
share. 
                                                                 
Figure 3: Relationship between the price of firm ‘i’ and price of firm ‘k’ 
 
While the above provides separate solutions for prices and shares of firm i by 
eliminating the econometric endogeneity between them, the price charged by firm i is 
still dependent on firm k’s price (see equation 12). Hence, the endogeneity arising 
from the fact that the prices of the two firms need to be jointly determined still 
remains, i.e. the problem of determining equilibrium market prices remains. Since Pi 
and Pk are symmetric, the price that firm k charges can be derived in the same way as 
the price of firm i, and can be expressed as:  
Price of 
firm i: Pi 






















+ + + =                             (14) 
While equations 12 and 14 do not appear to have a readily expressible closed-
form solution, Nash equilibrium prices can be determined as the point of intersection 
of plots of Pi given Pk and of Pk given Pi.  
 
4.2 Estimation Procedures 
 Equation (3b) provides a formulation that accurately approximates the 
LambertW function for all x. Using the formulation in (3b) we can rewrite equation 
(13) in the following way, 
0 0
0 0
( 1 ) ( 1 )
* 2
1 1 1( ) ( )
(1.04) (.665) ln( 1) (.0129)[ln( 1)]
1 1
β β β β
β β β βγ γ γ
− − − −
− −= + + + + ++ +
i i i i i i






 ,                 
(15) 
where γ1 = 1/β1. As we are now interested in estimating equation (15), assume an 
unobservable term for the price equation denoted by ωi, and that the price is linear in 
the unobservable term ωi.  Hence equation (15) can be rewritten as:  
0 0
0 0
( 1 ) ( 1 )
* 2
1 1 1( ) ( )
(1.04) (.665) ln( 1) (.0129)[ln( 1)]
1 1
β β β β
β β β βγ γ γ ω
− − − −
− −= + + + + + ++ +
i i i i i i
k k k k k k
C C






Equation (16) is now independent of the effect of the firm’s own market share 
and hence can be estimated without the use of firm level instrumental variables. The 




parameters to be estimated would include 1γ  and all the β’s.  It is important to note 
that if the market prices are set endogenously, the researcher would estimate (16) and 
a similar equation for the prices of firm k simultaneously, using suitable market level 
instrumental variables.  
5. A More General Application Incorporating Marketing Expenditure 
 
We apply this methodology to the multinomial logit problem studied by 
Basuroy and Nguyen (1998). The authors discuss the appropriateness of Multinomial 
Logit (MNL) market share models for equilibrium analysis. Their results show that a 
linear price response in conjunction with the typical concavity assumed in a large 
range of marketing response functions would yield an interior equilibrium solution. 
The authors then consider the optimal pricing and marketing expenditure reactions to 
entry and potential market expansion. In the context of the MNL models, they 
demonstrate that the entry of a new brand evokes a defensive reaction through a 
decrease in the equilibrium prices of the existing brands. They also note that while 
new entry into a fixed market triggers the incumbents to lower marketing 
expenditure, when faced with market expansion, firms tend to raise marketing 
activities. Consequently, there exist distinct possibilities that marketing efforts for the 
existing brands increase in view of entry in an expanding market.  
In this section we will incorporate the characteristics outlined by the authors, 
namely—the linearity of price response and the concavity of market expenditure 




solutions for price and market expenditure independent of market share by employing 
the methodology developed in the earlier part of this paper. 
Consistent with Basuroy and Nguyen, let P1 and m1 be the price charged and 
marketing expenditure of Firm 1 for its product. Let P2 and m2 the price charged and 
marketing expenditure of Firm 2 for its product. We assume a linear price response 
function and a concave marketing response function. The market share function for 
Firm 1 is given by, 
               
1
1 1 1 2 1
1 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
(1 )













+ − + −
=
+
,                      (17) 
where S1 is the market share for Firm 1, β11 is the price response parameter that is 
assumed to be negative and β21 is the market response parameter that is assumed to be 
positive. We assume that Firm 2 has a market share function that is analogous to Firm 
1. Given the market share function for Firm 1, the profit function for Firm 1 becomes, 
                                 1 1 1 1 1 1( )P c N S m FCπ = − ⋅ ⋅ − − ,                                    (18) 
where π1 is the profit that Firm 1 gets from selling its product, c1 is the marginal cost 
incurred by Firm 1 and FC1 is the firm’s fixed cost and N is the market size. 
Assuming that the firm is a price setter and assuming the existence of a pure 
strategy interior equilibrium, the price vector satisfies the first order conditions. We 
can obtain the optimal price that Firm 1 should charge for its product by solving the 
first order conditions for P1. The first derivative with respect to P1 is given by,                 
                  
1
.
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 )P S N P c N S Sπ β= − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −                                         (19) 
Similarly, the first order conditions for marketing expenditure m1 can be obtained by 
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1
.
1 1 11 1 1( ) (1 ) 1
m
m P c N e S Sπ β −= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − −                                  (20) 
We can now use the LambertW functional form to solve equations (17), (19) 
and (20) and obtain the optimal solutions for price P1 and marketing expenditure m1, 
independent of the firm’s market share. We solve the equations simultaneously and 
obtain the following solutions for the optimal price and optimal marketing 
expenditure: 
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where 
1
*P  is the optimal price charged by Firm 1 and,    









= −  
 
,                                         (22) 
where  
1
*m  is the optimal marketing expenditure. As β11 is assumed to have a negative 
value, both P1 and m1 from equations (21) and (22) will always be positive. Hence, 
the methodology developed in this paper allows us to derive closed form solutions to 
both the optimal price and the optimal marketing expenditure, where the optimal 
price depends on cost and competitor price.  
Comparing our results with Basuroy and Nguyen (1998) we find, as shown in 
figure 4, that the optimal price charged by the Firm 1 would decrease upon the 
introduction of a new product in the market. This is consistent with the results 
obtained by the authors. 
   











          Figure 4: The decrease in P1* with increase in P2 
 
It is relatively harder to analyze the marketing expenditure function as the 
functions only involve the price response parameter of Firm 1.  Thus, we cannot make 
predictions about the change in marketing expenditure with respect to the entry of a 
competitor. However we can make predictions of the effect of an increasing market 
size on the marketing expenditure. Taking the first derivative of marketing 
expenditure function given in equation (22) we find that  







                                                                                 (23) 
This implies that the marketing expenditure function shares a positive 
relationship with the market size. Hence as market size increases, the marketing 
expenditure of Firm 1 must also increase, albeit at a decreasing rate. This result is 










6.  Conclusion 
 In this paper we analytically solved the problem of econometric endogeneity 
in discrete choice models through the use of the LambertW function. The LambertW 
function lends itself to analytically solving exponential equations, and thereby 
facilitates the derivation of closed-form solutions for price and market share. The 
LambertW function also lends itself to easy estimation through a simple yet accurate 
approximation as explained in sections 2 and 4.2. This approximation can be used in 
estimating expressions for price and share that depend only on competitor actions, 
and that therefore do not require firm level instrumental variables. Market level 
instrumental variables, which are easier to obtain, suffice. The LambertW function is 
potentially useful whenever logit models are employed in theoretical or empirical 









Chapter 2: Essay 2 - Pricing Related Products In A Competitive 
Environment – The Role Of Contingent Valuations Between 
Products 
Summary 
This paper extends the research by Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) to 
consider the case of pure component pricing in a competitive setting. We develop an 
optimal pricing scheme for a Firm that has two products, when its products are sold as 
pure components. We show that the optimal price increases monotonically with 
respect to the contingent valuation of both the Firm’s and its competitor’s products. 
We also derive the consumer surplus when the products are priced independently and 
when they are priced by taking into account the contingent valuation. We conclude 
that consumer surplus is higher in the former case. 
1. Introduction 
 
Implicit bundles refer to the group of products that are sold separately (also 
referred to as pure components) but could be perceived by the consumer as products 
that would provide an enhanced level of satisfaction if purchased together. In many 
cases, the implicit bundles are sold by the same Firms. An example would be 
Microsoft selling both its Windows Operating System and Office Suite. It has been 
shown that even though Microsoft sells these products separately, they still price 




Office, even though Windows costs almost twice as much to develop (Economides 
and Viard 2003). Most Firms market products in many different product lines, so it is 
very important for the Firms to develop optimal pricing strategies for their products in 
the different product lines. Many issues go into establishing optimal pricing schemes. 
The study of the effect of inter-category relationships between the products made by 
the same manufacturer on the pricing scheme is very important, because this could 
affect the consumption behavior of the consumer. This topic has been studied in some 
detail in the retail setting (Manchanda et al. 1999). However, with the exception of a 
handful of studies (Reibstein and Gatignon 1984; Urban 1969), the literature has 
generally ignored how manufacturers must treat this problem when pricing their 
products across the different product lines (Elrod et al. 2002).  
The aim of this paper is to address the issue of pricing across different product 
lines. We do so by developing a model that would account for the possible 
relationships of the products across the different product lines. We hope to show that 
accounting for these relationships would decrease the amount of price competition in 
the market and also allow the Firm to enjoy higher profits, because it would be able to 
charge the consumer for the additional surplus gained by purchasing both products 
from the same Firm. We also account for the endogeneity of price and market share 
when deriving the optimal price. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in §2. 
Model Development is carried out in §3. The conclusions and managerial 





2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Product Relationships 
 
Traditionally inter-category relationships between products have been studied 
in the form of substitutes or complements. However these relationships are far more 
complex than just substitutes or complements. Product relationships can no longer be 
viewed upon as a simple dichotomy (either complements or substitutes) but these 
relationships should be viewed in terms of degree of complementarity and 
substitutability, not absolute substitutability or complementarity. 
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) explain these relationships in the form of 
contingent valuations. Many recent studies have indicated that buyers evaluate the 
components of a bundle by assigning certain valuations to the strength of the 
relationships in the bundle. (Jedidi et al. 2003, Yadav 1994). Contingent valuations 
measure this relationship between the components in the bundle. Contingent 
valuations may be defined as the degree of complementarity (or substitutability) 
between two products as perceived by the consumer, if the products were to be sold 
as a bundle (Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). Contingent valuations can be either 
positive or negative. A positive relationship implies that the two products share a 
complementary relationship and a negative relationship implies substitutability. In 
this study we focus only on the positive values of the contingent valuations, i.e., we 
confine our analysis to only complementary products as we are interested in 




pricing its products. More recently, Wang, Venkatesh and Chatterjee (2006) develop 
a new methodology to reformulate the the way reservation prices can be calculated. 
Their procedure named ICERANGE draws on literature on buyers’ uncertainty in 
preference and product knowledge. Their results demonstrate that the ICERANGE 
method significantly outperforms previous models in terms of predictive validity.  
For the purpose of this study we develop a pricing policy for two products that 
can be perceived by the consumer as having a relationship with each other. We then 
compare this pricing scheme to another pricing scheme where the products are priced 
independently of each other. In this study, we only consider implicit bundles, as we 
assume that it is not convenient for the manufacturer to explicitly bundle its products.  
The main difference between an explicit and implicit bundle would be that products 
in explicit bundles are sold together, while products in implicit bundles are sold 
separately. An example of an explicit bundle is the Microsoft Windows and Internet 
Explorer bundle. Here the consumer typically attains a higher level of satisfaction 
using the two products, but they are not sold separately.  An example of an implicit 
bundle is the Windows-Office bundle, where the products are sold separately, and the 
consumer enjoys a higher level of satisfaction by owning both the products. We will 
explain both the economic and legal reasons for this later on in this section. 
Implicit bundles can be composed of both complements and substitutes. For 
the purpose of this study, we only consider complements. Hicks (1939) was one of 
the first researchers to define complementary relationships. He argued that 
complementarity could be determined through a modification to the cross price 




Schultz (1938) and Hicks and Allen (1934) suggested that instead of using the sign of 
the cross price elasticity term as a measure of complementarity, it would be better to 
use a compensated price change to measure complementarity. The compensated price 
change term considers the effect of not only the change in price, but also the effect of 
income. A negative value of the compensated price change implied a complementary 
relationship. (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). Samuelson (1972) also developed a 
measure for complementarity called the money metric. He proposed that if we 
consider the von Neumann utility function (as a money metric, with diminishing 








, where V[.] is the von Neumann utility function and qi is demand for 
product i and qj is demand for product j. 
      In marketing, Guilitinan (1987) provides an excellent overview of how 
complementarity can arise between any two products. Two products become 
complements in the following situations: 
 Savings in Search Economies: A motorist prefers going to a dealer who does 
both an engine tune up and an oil change as opposed to two dealers separately 
offering only one of the services each. The savings in time and effort gained 
by the consumer, by going to a single dealer creates a degree of 
complementarity between the services offered by the dealer. 
 Enhance Customer Satisfaction: Guilitinan (1987) offers the example of a ski 
lodge that provides both ski lessons and rentals. The combination of services 




 Improved Total Image: He provides the example of a Firm that offers both 
lawn care as well as shrub care services, thereby enhancing the image of the 
Firm. 
Shocker et al. (2004) also attempt to define complementary products. They 
identify three types of complementary relationships, perfect complements (e.g., video 
cassette recorder and video cassette), augmenting complements (products that add 
new benefits not present in an already existing one, e.g., washing machine and dryer) 
and enhancing complements (new products that improves the sales of an already 
existing product, e.g., clipart and presentation software).  
Inspite of there being a lot of research on bundling of products (Hanson and 
Martin 1990, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, Venkatesh and Mahajan 1993, Chung 
and Rao 2003), only Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) have looked at the 
relationships between complementary products using contingent valuations. They 
derive optimal bundling and pricing strategies taking into account the contingent 
valuations of the two products of a monopolist. They compare the derived pricing 
schemes to the pricing scheme if these products were priced independently of each 
other. They show that the price increases monotonically as a function of the 
contingent valuation. 
 
The aim of this study is to extend the paper by Venkatesh and Kamakura 
(2003) to incorporate the effects that competition would have on the optimal pricing 
strategy. This condition has not been explored in their study. We propose that the 




We also propose that the price that accounts for these valuations, will always be 
higher than if they were priced independently (when market share is the same), 
provided the valuations always have a positive value (in the case of substitutes these 
valuations could be negative).  
We assume that the firm finds it is disadvantageous to offer an explicit bundle of its 
products in the market. This situation can arise under two conditions: 
1. Competition:  Anderson and Leruth (1993), show that in a duopoly 
environment, only pure components pricing may be offered in 
equilibrium since Firms fear the extra degree of competition inherent 
in offering the option of a bundle (in the case of complements). Our 
study differs from Anderson and Leruth (1993) in that they do not 
consider contingent valuations or try to formally develop a pricing 
scheme. Our assumption is further supported by Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992) who also show that in a competitive setting the pure 
components strategy is dominant.  
2. Conditions for Legality:  Stremersch and Tellis (2002) raise the issue 
of legality of introducing product bundles in a competitive market. 
U.S. Law has two rules which determine the legality of any bundle, the 
‘per se rule’ and ‘rule of reason’. The per se rule says that bundling is 
illegal when it involves pure bundling of separate products by a Firm 
with market power and when a substantial amount of commerce is at 
stake. The rule of reason says that bundling is illegal when it involves 




involving a substantial amount of commerce, which poses a threat that 
the bundling Firm will acquire additional market power over at least 
one of the products that is bundled with the tying products and no 
plausible consumer benefits offset the potential damage to 
competition. Details of the above rules are provided in the Stremersch 
and Tellis (2002) paper. 
Hence, under such conditions, as explicit bundling is either disadvantageous 
or restricted due to legal reasons, it is important for a Firm that manufactures two 
different yet related complementary products to develop an optimal pricing scheme 
that accounts for the relationship of the two products. We restrict the analysis in this 
paper to this scenario. 
 
2.2 Complementary Pricing 
 
Liao et al. (2002a, 2002b) study the effect of pure component pricing on the 
equilibrium of the market. They show that if Firms are restricted to pure component 
pricing scenario, then the market attains a stable equilibrium only when the two 
products made by the Firm are incompatible with the products made by the 
competing Firms. However, if the products are compatible, then the market attains a 
stable pure strategy equilibrium only if the bundle pricing of the complementary 
products is allowed. 
In the marketing literature, Reibstein and Gatignon (1984) develop a model for 




model developed by Urban (1969). They develop a model that includes cross-
elasticities of the various products made by the manufacturer, and use the method of 
seemingly unrelated regression to estimate the model.  
Complementarity for the most part has been largely ignored by the marketing 
literature (Elrod et al. 2002), however there do exist some models of pricing 
summarized by Tellis (1986), which are presented below: 
1. Captive Pricing: Captive pricing occurs when the manufacturer 
charges a low price for the base good and then charges a higher 
monopoly price for the accessory product (the base good is assumed to 
work only with the accessory). This is successful because the 
consumers might not view the basic product they purchased as a sunk 
cost and hence may try and recover their ‘money’ by purchasing the 
accessories and using it (‘Sunk Cost Effect’, Thaler 1980, 1985). The 
consumer may also use this product more than expected and hence buy 
more of the accessory. This has led researchers to label this scheme as 
the ‘captive pricing scheme’.  
The main restraint on captive pricing is that, if the manufacturer 
charges a high price for the accessory, it could lead to the entry of 
competing Firms in the market for the accessory, thereby reducing the 
Firm’s net profit. 
2. Two-Part Pricing: The price here is broken into a fixed fee and a usage 
fee. Two part pricing is a type of captive pricing scheme that is 




heterogeneity in demand for the products. Hence the heavy user would 
pay more to use the service than the light user. Oi (1972) illustrates 
this by applying this model to the case of Disneyland where the 
customer would pay an entry fee to enter the park and then a usage fee, 
i.e., spend on rides and other items in the park based upon their 
demands for these items.  
Sales from both captive and two-part pricing are classified as types of tie-in 
sales. Apart from the legal difficulties mentioned earlier, tie-in sales suffer from some 
other legal difficulties also. For example the procedure of tying the buyer to purchase 
the supplies from the same Firm that manufactured the base product may be 
considered to be illegal under the Sherman Act of 1890 or the Clayton act of 1914 
(Burstein 1960, Mathewson and Winer 1997). This paper thus aims to develop a 
pricing scheme, when tie-in sales are not an option, by considering the contingent 
valuations of the products. 
 
3. Model Formulation 
 
3.1 Defining the Market Structure 
First we describe the market structure. We consider two multi-product Firms 
(i = 1, 2). Each Firm has two products, one in category A and one in category B. The 




manufactures products Ai and Bi and competes with the products made by the other 
Firm. This structure is illustrated in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5:  The Market Structure 
Both products Ai and Bi share a complementary relationship which is 
parameterized by θi. θi measures the degree of complementarity between the two 
products within the Firm i. Thus θi is the contingent valuation of relationship between 
the two products.  
The notion of contingent valuations arises when a consumer perceives the two 
products as if they were a bundle, complementing each other in some way. This 
perception of complementarity could be because the products belong to categories 
that could be consumed together. Schmalansee (1982) indicated that the consumer’s 
reservation price for the bundle of Ai and Bi would be higher than the sum of the 


















stand alone reservation prices for the products when the products are complements. 












= +θ  …………..(1) 
 
where: 
RPAi+Bi = Consumer’s reservation price for the perceived bundle of products Ai and Bi 
RPAi = Consumer’s reservation price for the product Ai 
RPBi = Consumer’s reservation price for the product Bi 
θi lies in the range (0,1). When θi = 0, the products do not share a relationship 
and thus are independent of each other. When θi = 1, the products are perfect 
complements and hence cannot be used independently.  An example of this case 
would be a video cassette player and a video cassette. When 0 < θi < 1, the products 
can be used independently, however the consumer obtains a higher utility buying both 
the products (e.g., MS Windows and MS Office). When θi < 0, the products are 
substitutes. We however do not consider this case for the purpose of this study. 
When θi > 0, it is assumed that the consumer will prefer to buy both products 
from Firm i. 
3.2 Consumer Demand Formulation 
3.2.1 Contingent Valuation Condition 
 
The next step in the analysis would be to model the consumer’s demand for 




Firm 1, i.e., we provide optimal pricing schemes for Firm 1 when it competes with 
Firm 2. 
Therefore we must first define the utility that each consumer would derive 
from the each product marketed by Firm 1.  
If a consumer buys only product A1, then the utility that the consumer derives 
owning A1 is:  
……………(2a) 
where 
uj,A1,t = utility obtained by consumer j from product A1 at time t 
β0 = brand / product - specific parameter 
β1 = price response parameter for product A1 
PA1 = price of A1 
ΨA1,t = unobserved component of utility derived from product A1 
εj,A1,t = the random error term, which follows an iid type 1 extreme value distribution 
Similarly the utility for product B1 in period t for consumer j is given by: 
……………(2b) 
where 
uj,B1,t = utility obtained by consumer j from product B1 at time t 
γ0 = brand / product specific parameter 
γ1 = price response parameter for product B1 
PB1 = price of B1 
ΨB1,t = unobserved component of utility derived from product B1 
εj,B1,t = the random error term, which follows an iid type 1 extreme value distribution 
tAjtAtAj PAu ,,,110,, 111 εψββ ++−=




We are interested in determining a pricing scheme for when the consumer 
might be interested in purchasing both the products. For this we will modify the 
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) definition slightly to make the value of one item 
depend on whether or not the companion item is purchased. 
Let VA1 = tAPA ,110 1ψββ +−  ………….(3a)       and   
VB1 = tBPB ,1110 ψγγ +− ……………….(3b), 
where VA and VB are the values that the consumer attaches to the products A and B 
respectively. 
Therefore the value of A1 if B1 is purchased is: 
 VA1|B1 = VA1 + ηVB1……..(4a) 
where η is the contingent value between the two products. 
Conversely the value of A1 if B1 is not purchased becomes: 
 VA1|NB1 = VA1……….(4b) 
The expected value of product A1 thus depends on whether or not the companion item 
is purchased. 
 VA1
* = PB1 VA1|B1 + (1-PB1)VA1|NB1 
        = VA1 + PB η1VB1…………(5) 
where PB is the probability that the companion item B1 will be purchased. This 
probability depends on the price of B1: PB1, as well as the value of B1. Hence the 
expected value of owning A1 can be expressed as: 
 VA1
* = VA1 + E [f (VB1, PB1)]…………….(6a), 





 E [f (VB1, PB1)] = γ0 +  γ1PB1 + ψB1 …………..(6b) 
Thus VA1
* = VA1 + γ0 +  γ1PB1 + ψB1 + ε………….(7) 
Thus the consumer’s utility function for A1 would now depend on whether B1 
is purchased or not. Therefore the consumer’s utility for product A1 in period t for 
consumer j, given that consumer j expects to purchase B1 also, is given by: 
  
………….(8a) 
Similarly utility of B1 given A1 is 
 
…………..(8b) 
The next step would be to model the net demand for the products A1 and B1. 
To model demand we consider the logit demand model. The logit model has been 
used extensively in the marketing literature for modeling both household level data 
(Guadagni and Little 1983) as well as aggregate market share data (Allenby 1989). 
Here we model the aggregate market share using the logit formulation. The utility can 
be rewritten as a function of the deterministic part and the random component: 
uj,A1,t = UA1,t + εj,A1,t …………(9a) 
 uj,B1,t = UB1,t + εj,B1,t …………(9b) 
UA1,t and UB1,t represents the deterministic part, which is the aggregate utility 
obtained from A1 and B1. εj,A1,t and εj,B1,t represent the heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences for the two products, and they are assumed to be distributed iid type-1 
extreme value. 
tAjtAtBtAj PBPAu ,1,,1,11101110,1, )( εψψγγηββ ++++++=




To allow for the market share of the brand to expand and contract over the 
different periods with the choice of the marketing mix we allow for non-purchases 
(eg: an outside good, or choosing not to purchase), this is denoted as product 0. The 
utility of the outside product is normalized to 0 across periods; i.e. we assume U0,t = 
0. 
We now derive the choice shares for products A1 and B1 with respect to the 
option of the outside product 0 and the competitor’s products A2 and B2 respectively. 









1 ++ …………..(10) 
where SA1,t is the probability of the choice of product A1. Hence the choice share for 
product A1 is dependent on the utility of A2, which is a function of the relationship 
between  A2 and B2, which is given by η2. Thus the choice share for B1 is hence 
analogous to Equation (10) and SB1,t is the probability of the choice of product B1. 
For the next step in our analysis we derive the elasticities of the market share 
of the products A1 and B1 with respect to the prices of A1, B1, A2 and B2.  
























































































































3.2.2 No Contingent Valuation Condition 
 
We also derive the case when manufacturers are unaware of the existence of 
the contingent valuations of the two products, and price the two products accordingly. 
This no contingent valuation condition is labeled ‘nc’. This step is carried out to 
facilitate comparison and to elucidate the importance of identifying the various 
contingent effects.  




Hence we again split the model into the deterministic component and random 
component as follows: 
ui,A1,t,nc = VA1t + εiA1t,nc………..(13a) 
ui,B1,t,nc = VB1t + εiB1t,nc………..(13b) 
where: 
VA1,t =  deterministic component of utility for product A1 
VB1,t =  deterministic component of utility for product B1 
Thus market share of product A1 at time t is given by: 
nctAjnctAncncncnctAj PAu ,,1,,,1,1,1,0,,1, εψββ +++=












1 ++ …………(14) 
Thus market share of product B1 at time t is analogous to Equation (14). 
For the next step in our analysis we derive the elasticities of the market share of the 
products A1 and B1 with respect to the prices of A1, B1, A2 and B2.  


































































































































In the above equations 15a and 15b, as we assume the ‘nc’ condition the off-
diagonal terms are zero in contrast to equations 11a and 11b. Specifically there is no 
effect of the change of price of A2 on the market share of B1 or of the change of price 
of B2 on the market share of A1. It is also evident that the change in price of A1 has to 
effect on the market share of B1 and vice versa. 
 
3.3 Manufacturer’s Profit Function 
We now proceed to derive the manufacturer’s profit function for the two 





3.3.1 Pricing with no contingent valuation 
 
We first consider the case when the manufacturer prices not realizing the 
presence of a relationship between the two products it manufactures. 
The manufacturer profit function πt,nc in the nc condition is given by: 
nctBncnctAncnct SNCBPBSNCAPA ,,11,1,,11,1, )()( ⋅−+⋅−=π ……………..(16) 
where: 
CA1: marginal cost of product A1 
CB1: marginal cost of product B1 
N: Total number of consumers in the market for the products. 





























Equations (17a) and (17b) represent the optimal prices charged in the ‘nc’ condition. 
 
3.3.2 Pricing with Contingent Valuations 
 
The next step in our formulation of the optimal prices is to define the 
manufacturer’s profit function when contingent valuations are recognized by the 
Firm. As we account for the market share of each product in each period, the 
manufacturer’s profit function πt can be formulated as: 




Firm 1’s aim is thus to maximize profit with respect to PA1 and PB1 in each period. 
Therefore we differentiate the profit function with respect to PA1 and PB1, and obtain 



























          
 ..(19b) 
We then solve equations 19a and 19b to get the optimal prices PA1 and PB1 for Firm 











































The price charged by the manufacturer when contingent valuations are 
considered is always greater than the price charged by the manufacturer in the no 
contingent valuation condition for all positive values of η1.  
Proof 
The Equations (20a) and (20b) for the price of the products when contingent 























































Comparing the equation (17a) with (20a) we can see that equation (20a) ≥ 
(17a) for all η1 ≥ 0, when the market shares are assumed to be equal. Also (20b) ≥ 
(17b) for all η1 ≥ 0.  We can then rewrite equations (20a) and (20b) as functions of the 
price charged in the ‘nc’ condition (17a and 17b) and the premium charged when 






































Thus the premium charged when contingent valuations are considered is an 
increasing function of the contingent valuations.   
 
Result 1 
For a given market share, net profit will always be greater when the 
manufacturer prices the products utilizing the symbiotic relationship between them. 
Proof 
From the above analysis, we can conclude that, when the market shares are 
the same, the profit obtained under the ‘nc’ condition will be less than the profit 
obtained when the contingent valuations are considered. Thus πt ≥  πt,nc. 
One of the main issues of using the logit model in empirical analysis is the 
endogeneity of price with market share (Berry 1994). For example, if we consider 
product A1, its price PA1* and market share SA1,t will be correlated. It is thus difficult 
to predict whether market share drives the price or vice versa. Berry (1994) suggests 
that when estimating the equations with data, the researcher should make use of 
appropriate instrumental variables so as to overcome this endogeneity problem. 
However, as we are deriving an analytical model for the optimal prices for the Firm, 
we follow the procedure employed by Aydin and Ryan (Working Paper). They 




price, which is independent of the market share drivers. Following this approach we 
solve for PA1* and SA1,t, so as to make the price equation of product A1 dependent on 
only the market share of  product B1  and η1. Similarly we solve for PB1* and SB1,t so 
as to make the price equation of B1 dependent on only the market share of A1and η 1. 
Solving for PA1
* and PB1



















































































           




















































































                                                                                                                         
……(22b)2,3 
                                                 
1 Solving 21a and 21b simultaneously eliminates the endogeneity between the firm’s own price and 
own market share. However endogeneity between the competing firms’ prices still remains. 
2 The Lambert W function is the inverse of the function given by f(x) = xex, where W is the function 
that satisfies W(x)eW(x) = x for all real values of x. The Lambert W function has a concave shape 
(Chapeau-Blondeau, F. and Monir, A 2002; Corless et.al. 1996).  
3 Equation (22a) and (22b) are now independent of the effects of the ‘own market share’ of the product. 
Hence it is possible to isolate the effects of the contingent valuations on the price without the 
possibility of price endogeneity bias due to the relation between price and market share, i.e., changes in 
price due to changes in η1 will have no effect on the own market share of the product. In Equation 
(20a) and (20b) it would not have been possible to isolate the effect of the contingent valuation on 






Concluding from proposition 1 we know that PA1* and PB1* will always be 
greater than PA*1,nc  and PB*1,nc for all η1 > 0. Thus when η1 > 0, the premium 
charged above the ‘nc’ price will increase monotonically with respect to the 
contingent valuation η1, for values between 0≤ η1 ≤0.45. For values between 0.45 < η1 
≤ 1, the premiums decrease monotonically with respect to the contingent valuation η1. 
Hence premiums always increase for A1 are B1 when 0≤ η1 ≤0.45 but decrease 
slightly when 0.45 < η1 ≤ 1.  
COMMENT  
The variation of PA1* with respect to η1 is given in Figure 6.  It is evident 
from the graph that the price of A1 varies with respect to the contingent valuation. 
This result is also applicable to the relationship between the price of B1 and η1.  
For values 0≤ η1 ≤0.45, valuation of a pair of complements (η1 > 0) exceed 
those for independently valued products (η1 = 0), the seller thus gains more by 
charging higher prices while stimulating the consumers to buy both the products. 
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) also obtained the same results. However as seen in 
our results (Figure 2a), when η1 lies between (0.45,1) the optimal price decreases 
slightly. This result is different from the results obtained by Venkatesh and Kamakura 
(2003). The main reason for this difference is that they did not consider 
interdependent utilities and competitive effects. 
When η1 increases from 0.45 to 1, the Firm’s products become tied to each 




the consumers will be locked to Firm 1. When the consumer is locked to a Firm, all 
three marketing strategies (pure components, pure bundling and mixed bundling) are 
equivalent to pure bundling (Matutes and Regibeau 1992). Hence the price charged 
for each individual item would be equivalent to price charged if the products were 
sold as a bundle. As the price charged for a bundle is usually lower than when the two 
products are sold separately, we would expect a decline in the premium that would be 
charged.A very high degree of complementarity between the two products 
manufactured by the same Firm implies that the products cannot be used individually 
and hence the consumer gets no utility from purchasing just one of the products. This 
might explain the reason why we see that the optimal price starts decreasing as η1 → 
(0.45, 1). However it is important to note that even thought the premium decreases 
slightly, it is still higher than if the products were priced in the ‘nc’ condition. 
 
Figure 6: Variation of PA1 with respect to η1. 
RESULT 3 







The variation of PA1* with respect to η2 is given in Figure 7.  It is evident 
from the graph that the price of A1 increases monotonically with the contingent 
valuation of its competitor’s products. This result is also applicable to the relationship 
between the price of B1 and η2. As η2 increases the competitor can afford to increase 
its products prices without having any effect on its market share. As the competitor 
increases her prices, price competition between the two firms decreases, and hence 
Firm 1 can also increase her price slightly. 
As η2 increases the competitor’s products become increasingly dependent on 
each other. Thus if η1 is low, Firm 1 can capitalize on the exclusivity of the 
competitors products and charge a higher price for its own line of products. This 
could be the reason why we do not see a decrease in the premium that Firm 1 charges, 
even though the premium charged by Firm 2 decreases when η2 lies in the region 
(0.45, 1). 
 




             Figure 8 shows the variation of profit for Firm 1 with respect to both η1 and 
η2. We see that profit is maximum for high values of η2 and low values of η1. This 
result follows directly from result 2 and result 3. 
 
 Figure 8: Variation of Profit With Respect to η1 and η2  
 
3.4 Consumer Surplus 
Proposition 2 
Consumer surplus is lower when the Firm prices in the contingent valuation condition 
than when the Firm prices in the ‘nc’ condition. 
Proof: 
We derive the consumer surplus for consumer j.  Assuming utility has a dollar 
value, the consumer surplus, when the Firm recognizes the complementary effects 
and charges prices accordingly, is given by, 
CSj,t = uj,A1,t + uj,B1,t – PA1* - PB1*…………(23a) 




CSj,t,nc = uj,A1,t + uj,B1,t – PA1,nc* - PB1,nc*…………(23b) 
In equation 23b, the Firm is unaware of the complementary relationships between its 
two products, however the consumer enjoys the effects of complementarity between 
the two products. Therefore s/he is charged the price derived in the ‘nc’ condition. 
Hence (s)he would enjoy a higher utility with a lower price, thereby higher surplus. It 
is straightforward to see CSj,t ≤ CSj,t,nc as PA1* > PA1,nc* and  PB1* > PB1,nc*. This 
can also be observed pictorially in Figure 9. Consumer surplus when the 
manufacturer prices the product independently is given by the areas numbered (5) + 
(2) + (4). When the products are priced by considering the contingent value, the 
consumer surplus is given by the area numbered (5). Thus consumer surplus is higher 
when products are priced in the ‘nc’ condition. Thus, it is evident that consumer 
surplus decreases when the consumer purchases both products from the same 
manufacturer, who prices the products taking into account the contingent valuations.  
 
X Axis:   Quantity Purchased 
Y Axis:   Net Price Paid  
A:  ui,A1,t,nc + ui,B1,t,nc 
B:  ui,A1,t + ui,B1,t 




C:  Marginal cost of producing A1 and B1 (CA1+CB1) 
D:  Net Price Paid when the products are charged independently (PA1,nc* + PB1,nc*) 
E:     Net Price Paid when the products are charged considering the contingent effects   PA1* + 
PB1* 
1:  Expected Profit at PA1,nc* + PB1,nc* 
2:  Expected Profit at PA1* + PB1*. It is also the lost profit when products are not  
 priced as if they are related. 
1.+ 3.:     Net profit achievable at PA1,nc* + PB1,nc*, given that the entire market is not yet  
               satisfied. 
4: Deadweight loss when the product are increased in price from PA1,nc* + PB1,nc* 
 to PA1* + PB1*. 
5: Consumer Surplus after pricing at PA1* + PB1* 
5+2+4:    Consumer Surplus when priced at PA1,nc* + PB1,nc*. 
 
4.  Conclusion And  Managerial Implications 
 
Main Contribution 
This study contributes to the pricing literature by extending the paper by 
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) study to the case of competition. The study adds to 
the literature in the following ways: 
1. Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) show that the optimal price charged 
increases linearly and monotonically with respect to contingent valuations 
when products are sold as pure components. We show that this is not 
necessarily the case, while the optimal price does increase with respect to the 




The price first increases rapidly for small values of  η and then increases at a 
slower rate till η = 0.45. When 0.45< η < 1, we see that the optimal price 
actually decreases. Thus locking the consumer to the product reduce the 
optimal price that the manufacturer can charge and hence would reduce the 
optimal profit.  
2. We show that the optimal price will also increase with respect to the 
competitor’s contingent valuation, albeit at a slower rate. 
3. We also derive the surplus that the consumer would enjoy in each of the cases 
and show that the Firm can charge a higher price based on the contingent 
valuation mainly because the creation of a contingent valuation causes an 
increase in the overall surplus that the consumer could enjoy. The firm can 
thus take advantage of this increase and charge a higher price to the consumer. 
4. We isolate the effect of η on the price of the product by accounting for the 
endogeneity of market share and price. This helps us predict the variation of 
price with respect to η, without the price having any effect on its own market 
share.  This is significant because we can predict changes in price with respect 
to η, without the effect of market share of the product. 
The analysis carried out in the previous sections have helped us establish the 
following results: 
4. The prices of the products of Firm 1 increase with increase in the contingent 




5.  The prices of the products of Firm 1 increase with increase in the contingent 
valuation of the products manufactured by Firm 2. 
6. Firm 1 experiences a higher profit for the same market share, when its 
products are priced considering the contingent valuations than when they are 
priced independently of each other. 
7. Consumers who purchase the products would have a lower level of consumer 
surplus if the contingent valuation is recognized by the Firm. 
 
Managerial Implications 
We have established that the Firm can charge a premium for the products. It is 
important for a manager to decide how to split the net premium that can be charged 
between the two products. Should the net premium be split equally between the two 
products or applied solely to one of the products?  
Economides and Viard (2003) answer this question on the basis of the 
network externality of the products. They consider two products MS Windows and 
MS Office, both made by the same manufacturer. They propose that an optimal 
pricing scheme would be to charge high for Office and low for Windows (even 
though it costs Microsoft twice as much to develop Windows than it does to develop 
Office). They show that the network externality generated through the sale of 
Windows would increase the value of Office, and hence the profit lost by Windows 
can be recouped by Office. This is however only true of markets with strong network 




For other markets, we could use the axioms of prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler 1980,1985) to understand how to 
distribute the premium among the products. For example, when the consumer has to 
purchase a base product (e.g., printer) and then make repeated purchases of an 
accessory (it is assumed that the accessory is not exclusive) (e.g., ink) to use the base 
product, it might be better to charge a higher price for the base product. This is 
because the consumer would mostly relegate the price paid for the base product to the 
level of a sunk cost (decoupling the costs and benefits, Soman and Gourville 2001), 
and look to only the future price of the accessory as the basis for his/her choice of the 
accessory product.  
Another important example is the razor and blade pricing strategy. This is a form of 
captive pricing, since the consumer is locked to the Firm (η = 1) once they purchase 
the razor.  
Purchase behavior may also be affected by heterogeneity in the willingness to 
pay for the base product. For a light user/low end segment it might be better to lower 
the cost of the base product, so that the segment enters the market, and increase the 
cost of the accessory as they would not use as much of the accessory. This is akin to 
the captive pricing scenario talked about earlier. It suffers from an obvious weakness, 
the entry of competitors in the accessory market would cause the low (light) end 
(user) segment to choose the competitor. In such a situation, for the low end segment, 






Implications for Marketing Management 
The analysis in this paper provides the following managerial conclusions: 
1. Building contingent valuations is important as it helps in limiting the role of 
price competition in the market. 
2. If the Firm accounts for the existence of contingent valuations when setting 
the prices of the different products, the Firm would get a higher profit as it 
would get some of the extra surplus that the consumer accrues from owning 
the two products. 
Therefore it is important for Firms to ensure that its new product lines have a 
positive  relationship to its existing range of products.  To better understand how a 
Firm could build contingent valuations into its product line we consider the example 
of Apple Computer. In October 2001, Apple introduced its portable MP3 player iPod. 
The iPod allowed for ease of portability of each customers MP3 music collection and 
was considered a better option to the available MP3 players at that time due to the 
fact that it could hold significantly more songs that the average MP3 player and also 
because it had a more sophisticated design. Although MP3 music was easy to 
download, the practice of downloading music suffered from a multitude of legal 
difficulties. This did not permit iPod sales to reach their full potential.   
In the beginning of 2003, several new competitors like Dell began entering the 
market and selling their own MP3 players at significantly lower prices. Thus Apple 
now faced two challenges, one from the legal problems of downloaded MP3 music, 




As a means to overcome this problem, Apple introduced its iTunes online music 
download service. This service allowed consumers to download music both legally 
and at a very low price. However Apple ensured exclusivity of the downloaded 
music, as it was not in the MP3 format (Kanellos 2004, CNET News). This ensured 
that the downloaded music could be played only on the iPod (which was played both 
the MP3 and the AAC format, the AAc format was copyrighted by Apple) and not on 
competing MP3 players. As the iTunes service allowed for easy and legal downloads, 
consumers increasingly turned to iTunes as a source of music. This simultaneously 
increased demand for the iPod, as it allowed for portability of the consumer’s new 
music collection. Similarly consumers who purchased the iPod found iTunes to be a 
convenient source for music for their iPod player. Thus consumers derived a higher 
level of satisfaction when they purchased both the iPod and the iTunes service as 
opposed to purchasing only one of them. This allowed Apple to charge a higher price 
for its iPod player. Apple also escaped a future price competition that would have 
ensued with the introduction of new MP3 players by its competitors like Dell 
(Dalrymple, Technology Business Research 2003). Hence the introduction of  the 
iTunes service created a contingent valuation between iTunes and iPod and this 
allowed Apple to gain higher market share without sacrificing profits or bundling the 
two products together. After introducing iTunes, iPod sales were up 235% 






5. Future Research 
The procedure employed in this paper accounts for and solves the econometric 
endogeneity that is present between each firm’s own price and own marketshare. 
However, there is an extra level of endogeneity, namely between the focal firm’s 
price and the competitor’s price that needs to be considered when deriving 
equilibrium prices.  
To keep the model tractable we did not consider heterogeneity of the 
contingent valuation. In reality, the contingent valuations could vary across 
consumers, hence it is important to account for it. However there would be no closed 
form solution when accounting for the heterogeneity and hence one must develop 
simulation methods when trying to derive optimal pricing schemes accounting for 
differences in ηi. We could also consider the case when  ηA,B ≠ ηA,B, however we do 









CRM (Customer Relationship Management) interventions like direct mailings 
have long been used by firms to improve customer relationships. In this study we 
develop a method that will allow the firm to understand the effect of these 
interventions on customer loyalty. Loyalty is assumed to be unobserved and hence is 
modeled as a latent variable. We use an adaptation of a generalization of the ‘Hidden 
Markov Model’ (HMM) called the ‘State Space Model’ (SSM) to better predict a 
customer’s loyalty function towards a particular firm or product. The SSM models are 
structurally different from HMM models and they offer three main advantages over 
HMM models. First they are continuous and are described across all possible 
relationship states of the customer, hence we avoid the problem of explicitly choosing 
the number of states; second, they can be used to model an infinite number of 
relationship states; and third they are better at modeling recursive behavior, which is 
necessary when modeling customer behavior that involves the effect of experience. 
We adapt the SSM model to our study by combining the generic model with a set of 
covariates that we use to better understand customer loyalty. We call this model the 
SSMC (State Space  Model with Covariates). We also predict the customer’s 
probability of purchase given certain marketing actions and the predicted loyalty state 




customer’s probability of purchase at a given loyalty state. We apply this model to 
data from a retailer of health and beauty aids, to help them better understand the 
effect of their CRM interventions on the customer’s loyalty towards the firm and their 
repurchase intentions. We also point out the types of CRM interventions that play a 
role in improving the loyalty of the customer to the firm and those interventions that 
have no effect. This information can hence help the firm better organize its menu of 
CRM interventions. We can also compute the probability distributions across the 
loyalty states for each individual customer, thus providing the researcher with 
knowledge of each customer’s loyalty state. Finally we introduce a new methodology 
to the literature on modeling relationships in marketing. The methodology improves 
upon existing methods by allowing for a more flexible and efficient estimation 
procedure. We also compare our model’s predictions to those derived from two other 
estimation methods. We find that the predictions derived from our estimation 
procedure are better than those computed from the other methods discussed. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
            Customer relationship management (CRM) is a firm-wide approach to 
understanding and influencing customer acquisition, customer retention and customer 
value through interactive and relevant information exchange between the firm and the 
customer. The past few years have seen a multitude of research in the field of CRM, 
exploring several important facets such as selecting the right candidates from a 




intervention for each of the selected candidates (Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 
2004; Venkatesan and Kumar 2004; Rust and Verhoef 2005; Gonul and Shi 1998; 
Bitran and Mondschein 1996; Bult and Wansbeck 1995; Banslaben 1992; Roberts 
and Berger 1989; Kass 1976; Sonquist 1970), studying the link between satisfaction 
and commercial success (Kamakura et al. 2002), the link between customer loyalty 
and profitability (Rust, Lemon and Zeithaml 2004; Reinartz and Kumar 2000), 
customer profitability heterogeneity (Niraj, Gupta and Narasimhan 2001), customer 
loyalty programs (Verhoef 2003) and towards establishing a sound construct of the 
CRM process (Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer 2004).  In this essay we develop a 
methodology that actually estimates a customer’s loyalty state and allows one to 
predict the effect of a customer’s loyalty on their intention to repurchase.  
         Previous marketing literature defines loyalty as being either psychological or 
behavioral in nature. Psychological loyalty considers the underlying motivation of the 
consumer to repurchase  the same brand. It is based on the attitudes of the customer to 
the brand in question (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978).  Behavioral loyalty on the other 
hand depends on the purchase patterns of the customer. It is hence defined by the 
revealed behavior of the customer (Fader and Hardie 1996). Our model derives 
estimates of loyalty that indicate a tendency to engage in behavior that results in a 
purchase. This is similar to psychological loyalty as described in the literature. We 
then predict the probability of repurchase, thereby linking psychological loyalty to the 
revealed behavior of the customer, i.e. the customer’s behavioral loyalty. We carry 
out the tests in the following way. First we test whether a firm’s CRM interventions 




and estimate the customer’s loyalty states. We then check whether loyalty affects the 
probability that a customer will repurchase a product from the firm.  
 We conduct the above tests using an adaptation of state space models. We 
combine the state space model with a set of covariates that are used to predict loyalty. 
These models, continuous generalizations of hidden Markov models, allow one to 
develop a continuous loyalty function that can help the firm better understand the 
customer and also allow the firm to understand the efficacy of their marketing 
interventions. State space models supersede hidden Markov models on two counts:  
 In the hidden Markov model the researcher would have to make assumptions 
about the possible number of loyalty states, while in the state space model no 
such assumptions have to be made due to the continuous nature of the 
function over all possible states   
 The second advantage lies in the fact that the hidden Markov model assumes 
loyalty to be a discrete variable, which is a simplifying approximation. The 
state space model allows us to relax this assumption. 
 Hence using state space models, the firm will learn which CRM 
interventions actually have an effect on customer loyalty and hence can better 
organize their interventions to take advantage of this new insight. The other 
advantage of this methodology lies in the fact that one can even use discrete data to 
obtain a continuous loyalty function.  
              The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the existing CRM 




development is carried out in §3. We describe the data and estimation procedure in §4 
and present results in §5. Finally in §6 we provide our conclusions.  
2. CRM Models 
 
CRM has become increasingly important in marketing. There are now many 
different ways to manage customer relationships in marketing. Direct mail, which 
was once synonymous with customer relationship management studies, is now 
complemented by a host of other techniques like email marketing and other advanced 
procedures for customer targeting etc., which are now increasingly used by retailers 
and manufacturers to manage customer relationships. Hence the efficient 
management of these customer interventions forms the essence of customer 
relationship management. Towards the goal of efficient management, there are many 
factors that play an important role, for example the timing of the marketing 
intervention, the frequency of purchase, the monetary value of the purchase, the 
customer characteristics etc. (Nash 1984). There are many models proposed in 
marketing to help firms manage customer relationships by choosing both the right 
customers and the right market intervention scheme.  
One of the first CRM models was the RFM model (recency, frequency and 
monetary value) (Bitran and Mondschein 1996; Roberts and Berger 1989). Recency 
refers to the time since last purchase or the number of mailings since last purchase. 
Frequency refers to the number of purchases in a given period of time and monetary 
value refers to the monetary value of all purchases in a given period of time. Gonul 




determinants of an optimal mailing policy, while simultaneously maximizing both 
customer utility and firm profit. The authors discuss that due to its dynamic nature the 
model outperforms its single period counterparts. The model proposed in this paper 
incorporates the RFM variables and also includes a dynamic component.  
There are several other models that exist in the literature with an aim of 
improving the CRM intervention policy. These include AID and CH-AID (Sonquist 
1970, Kass 1976); the ‘Gains Chart Analysis’ (Banslaben 1992); finite mixture 
models (Bult and Wansbeck 1995); the DMLM Procedure (Elsner, Krafft and 
Huchzermeier 2004) which determines the optimal frequency size and customer 
segmentation of direct marketing activities; customer lifetime value models (Dwyer 
1989, Blattberg and Deighton 1996, Berger and Nasr 1998)  which used the 
customer’s lifetime value as a guide towards developing a better CRM intervention 
schedule.  
More recently Rust, Lemon and Zeithaml (2004) develop an approach that 
allows firms to achieve financial accountability by considering the effect of strategic 
marketing expenditures and by relating the improvements in customer equity to the 
expenditure required to achieve it. This thus allows firms to distinguish between 
customers and hence concentrate on its most profitable customers. Venkatesan and 
Kumar (2004) also use a CLV metric for customer selection and marketing resource 
allocation by developing a dynamic framework that enables managers to maintain and 
improve customer relationships proactively through marketing contacts across various 




are selected on the basis of their lifetime value provide higher profits in the future 
than do customers selected on the basis of several other customer based metrics.  
Apart from the methods discussed above there are several other procedures 
that allow firms to better manage customer relationships. For example Ansari and 
Mela (2003) develop a model to show that (in the case of an email manufacturer) it is 
better to customize the email marketing interventions to each individual customer's 
taste as this would increase the number of click throughs and hence increase revenue 
for the firm. As previously discussed the customer-centric approach in marketing lays 
great emphasis on the calculation of customer lifetime value (CLV) which is defined 
as the value of future cash flows associated with a customer (Pfeifer, Haskins and 
Conroy 2005). CLV measures focus on the future and not on the past. In contrast, the 
direct marketing literature use measures of customer’s prior behavior to predict their 
future behavior. This is best summarized through the RFM (Recency Frequency 
Monetary value) models.  
Fader, Hardie and Lee (2005a) by the means of a stochastic model integrate 
the RFM paradigm with CLV. They use ‘iso-value’ curves to illustrate the 
interactions between RFM measures and CLV and discuss the practical application of 
the model. Their approach proposes using the RFM variables as sufficient variables 
for an individual customer’s purchasing history and eliminating the need for 
additional data to calculate CLV. Additionally Fader, Hardie and Lee (2005b) 
develop the beta-geometric/NBD (BG/NBD) as an alternative model to the 
Pareto/NBD model developed by Schmittlein et al. (1987). The BG/NBD model 




The model is used in cases where predicting the future purchase of the customer is 
important to managers as they are interested in estimating the customer’s lifetime 
value to the firm. 
In our study we are interested in learning about the psychological loyalty of 
the customer to the firm. As we do not have any data on the measures of 
psychological loyalty of the customer, we need to incorporate loyalty as a latent 
variable. Additionally we also model the effect of the CRM interventions on the 
transition of the customer across the different loyalty states. Past research (Rust, 
Zeithaml and Lemon 2000) used Markov Chain Models to study customer 
relationships, migration and retention scenarios. More recently Netzer, Lattin and 
Srinivasan (2005) model the dynamics of customer relationships using transaction 
data using Hidden Markov models (HMM). Their model of relationship dynamics 
incorporates the idea that customer encounters may have an enduring impact by 
shifting the customer from one unobservable relationship state to another. The hidden 
Markov model (HMM) allows for transitions among latent relationship states and 
effects on buying behavior. The dynamics of customer relationships with firms are 
more or less continuous, owing not just to purchase encounters with the firm, but also 
with competing firms, CRM interventions etc. Hence, we extend this methodology by 
employing a state space model, a method that allows us to model relationships as a 
continuous function, as a more efficient approach towards studying customer 





Finally, Rust and Verhoef (2005) propose a hierarchical model to manage 
customer relationships that individualize rather than segmentize the population of 
customers. Their results show that customers are highly heterogeneous in their 
responses to marketing interventions. As we conduct our analysis at the level of the 
individual customer, we use a hierarchical model to study the customer relationships 
and interactions between the customer and the firm.  
 
3. Model Development 
  
We will provide a short description of the scenario that will be considered in 
this paper. The case is of a multi-product customer goods company that wants to sell 
products to its customers through its own line of stores. The company sends out a 
variety of marketing interventions (email, snail mail, etc.) periodically. The aim of 
our study is to help the firm understand which CRM interventions strengthen the 
loyalty of the customer towards the brand and in turn study the impact of loyalty on a 
customer’s intention to repurchase from the firm. We do so by predicting the 
customer’s probability of purchase at a given point in time, their loyalty state at a 
given time and the likelihood that a customer will make a purchase at a given loyalty 
state.  
The model described here is one of individual level buying behavior. We 
consider a panel of customers and their repeated interactions with the firm. The data 
that we use is the typical transaction data that is commonly used in various models of 




history but also the marketing environment at that time. This information will help the 
manufacturer better understand the relationship between the customer and the firm. 
The relationship is comprised of a longitudinal sequence of encounters, each of which 
contain information including, but not limited, to purchases made, whether mailings 
were sent, the recency and frequency of purchases etc. 
 Additionally we define a series of hidden or latent loyalty states for each 
customer. These loyalty states are indicative of a tendency of the customer to engage 
in behavior that results in a purchase. The transitions between these states are 
probabilistically determined and are affected by each relationship encounter. To date 
hidden Markov models (HMM) have been used to identify these states and predict 
transitions between these states. Hidden Markov models are discrete models. They 
have a finite number of different internal states that produce different kinds of 
outputs. Typically there are a couple of states for each encounter or a pair of 
encounters. The whole dynamical process of producing a relationship function is thus 
modeled by discrete transitions between the states corresponding to the different 
encounters.  
 Prior research, as mentioned above, has looked at psychological loyalty as 
comprising of discrete states that the customers transition between. While it is useful 
to consider loyalty as a discrete variable, it is a simplifying approximation. The 
approach we develop in this paper enables us to relax this approximation in a 
computationally feasible way. Psychological loyalty is modeled in this paper as a 
variable that is continuous across all possible loyalty states. We elaborate on this in 




Additionally, the dynamics of customer relationships with firms are more or 
less continuous, owing to not just purchase encounters with the firm, but also with 
competing firms, CRM interventions etc. This is of importance to a manager since 
customer interactions with the firm are no longer confined to just purchases. They 
now also include the firm’s own CRM interventions as well as their competitors’ 
interventions, which subsequently play a significant role in determining a customer’s 
future purchases. For example, an individual who receives a CRM intervention after 
making a purchase might be influenced positively by the mailing even if it does not 
result in an immediate purchase. Therefore, it is important to understand how these 
loyalty or relationship states evolve continuously over time with respect to the CRM 
interventions. It would be more beneficial to model the data with a continuous model, 
as the frequency with which CRM interventions are sent out is typically much higher 
than the frequency of purchase. Loyalty to a firm is hence assumed to be a continuous 
function and a good candidate for the task of modeling these loyalty transitions is a 
state space model (SSM).  
The SSM can be described as the continuous counterpart of the HMM. SSMs 
are a general method for the probabilistic modeling of sequences and time-series. 
They take the form of iterated maps on continuous state-spaces, and can have either 
discrete or continuous valued output functions. They are basically generalizations of 
the better known state-space models such as Hidden Markov models (HMMs). A 
SSM is, however, more powerful than a HMM. For example, a SSM can represent 
infinitely many distinct states as a consequence of their real-valued state-spaces 




states and hence can be no more powerful than strictly finite-automata. Finite-
automata cannot model many of the recursive structures found in human behavior, 
especially instances where learning or the effect of experience is involved. This 
occurs because a researcher is forced into organizing such behavior into a 
predetermined finite number of states, a step that is not necessary when using a SSM. 
A SSM can be expressed across all possible real valued states and transitions between 
these states are not confined to a predetermined number. Additionally the estimation 
of a hidden Markov model becomes much more inefficient as the number of states 
becomes very large (a situation encountered when modeling recursive behavior), a 
problem that is avoided in state space models due to their continuous nature. 
 If we assume x(t) is the observed data, and s(t) is the collection of internal 
hidden states of the dynamical system then a standard/generic SSM can be expressed 
as follows: 
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Both vectors m(t) and n(t) are the noise components of the two equations with 
m(t) being the process noise and n(t) the observation noise. Functions f and g are the 
linear or nonlinear mappings, with f being the observation mapping and g the process 














Figure 10: A standard State Space Model 
 
3.1 Modeling the Customer’s Probability of Purchase 
 
To model customer loyalty and likelihood of purchase we construct a model to 
predict the customer’s probability of re-purchase. We are interested in examining the 
effect of mailings and other variables on the probability of repurchase. At the same 
time we need to control for the time between two consecutive purchases made by the 
same household. A model that incorporates both these features (i.e. intrinsic purchase 
patterns over time and the effect of marketing variables) is the hazard model. The 
hazard model allows us to model the survival of the customer through the subsequent 
periods of interest, at the same time controlling for the effects of the marketing 
variables that are important to manufacturers, like the effect of CRM interventions on 
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assumed to survive as long as s/he does not make a purchase and the customer dies 
when s/he repurchases from the firm in a future period. The hazard model captures 
this intrinsic propensity of the customer to repurchase in a computationally feasible 
way.  
 Before defining the probability of purchase we first model the loyalty states 
of the customer. There are two approaches to loyalty considered in the literature. The 
first being a psychological approach towards loyalty, as was proposed by Jacoby and 
Chestnut (1978). The approach distinguishes itself from the behavioral approach (i.e. 
repeat purchases of a particular product in a given period of time) by including the 
attitudinal aspects of loyalty like the cognitive (the brand is preferable to competitive 
offerings), affective (preferential attitude for the brand) and conative (higher intention 
to buy the brand as compared to the alternatives) elements (Oliver 1999). For 
example loyalty could be viewed as a favorable set of stated beliefs towards the brand 
purchased. These attitudes can be gauged by asking how much people like the brand, 
feel attached to it, will recommend it to others, and have positive beliefs and feelings 
about it – relative to some other competing brands (Reichheld 1996, Dick and Basu, 
1994). This then translates into behaviors that result in repurchase. The tendency to 
repeatedly purchase the same brand leads to behavioral loyalty. Thus behavioral 
loyalty is the propensity to repurchase from the same firm in future time periods and 
is defined mainly on the pattern of past purchases. (Fader and Hardie 1996, 
Ehrenberg and Scriven 1999).  
The approach we develop in our study estimates the hidden loyalty states that 




states we derive are similar to the psychological loyalty as described in the literature. 
Our study relates the psychological loyalty of the customer to the behavioral 
outcomes explained above. We construct a model to estimate the psychological 
loyalty of the customer to the firm and then relate this estimated psychological loyalty 
of the customer to the behavioral loyalty that the customer exhibits in the form of a 
repurchase. Thus the framework developed in this paper relates the two loyalties, one 
observed (behavioral loyalty) and the other unobserved (psychological loyalty).  
We assume that there is a set of latent psychological loyalty states that 
influence behavior. The loyalty states can range from the customer being completely 
disloyal to the brand to one in which the customer is completely loyal to the brand. At 
a given point in time, each customer is assumed to occupy a particular loyalty state. A 
customer’s loyalty state can be affected by several variables like satisfaction, the 
purchase experience, affinity to a competitor’s product, marketing activities of the 
focal firm, quantity of the brand purchased etc. If the impact is positive it can cause 
the customer to transition to a loyalty state that is more loyal than the one s/he was 
previously in. On the other hand a negative impact can cause the customer to 
transition to a less loyal state. 
We divide the time a customer is in each loyalty state into intervals of 3 
months. Each quarter is represented by τ, where τ = 1 in quarter 1. At time τ, the 
loyalty state for each individual ‘i’ is represented by li(τ), and the distribution of these 
loyalty states within each individual, is represented by pi(li(τ)). As we are interested 
in estimating pi(li(τ)) using a Bayesian approach, we assume a prior distribution 




distribution for loyalty varies along the real number line from -∞ to +∞. If the loyalty 
state has a value of -∞ then the customer would be completely disloyal. At the value 
of 0, the customer is neither loyal nor disloyal to the brand and is more likely to 
engage in switching behavior, as (s)he is indifferent to the experience of using the 
brand. At this stage the customer behaves similar to a switcher. At +∞ the customer 
would be completely psychologically loyal to the brand.  
We will now proceed to model the customer’s probability of purchase. The 
inter-purchase times in the equation for probability of purchase is given by the 
number of days since purchase. Here time is indicated by ‘t’ and is calibrated at the 
daily level. The probability that customer ‘i’ chooses to purchase product j at time t is 
given by ,
i
j th . Let ( ( ))it ilγ τ be the baseline hazard function for customer i at time t and 
loyalty state li(τ). ijβ  is a vector of response parameters for customer i at time t for 
product j. We assume a prior distribution for ijβ  given by pi( iβ ).  Xijt is a row vector 
of covariates, which include customer attitudes and behaviors towards the brand that 
could have an impact on the probability of purchase. Some examples of such 
variables that affect the utility of a purchase and hence the probability of purchase 
include satisfaction, quantity purchased, price sensitivity, number of repeat purchases, 
distance to the store, interaction with frontline employees, trust and the variety of 
product offerings (Agustin and Singh 2005; Sirdeshmukh, Singh and Sabol 2002; 
Oliver 1999, 1997). The covariates also include marketing variables that are under the 
researcher’s control.  
  Loyalty is also a covariate in the equation for the probability of purchase and 




in understanding purchase behavior. He states that the psychological elements, as 
defined earlier that constitute our definition of loyalty can lead the customer to 
repurchase the brand. At a higher loyalty state a customer’s intention to make a 
purchase becomes stronger. Hence, it is important to include loyalty as a covariate in 
the purchase equation. ijα is a measure of how much loyalty affects the probability of 
purchase. We assume a prior for ijα given by pi( iα ).  
The utility that the customer will derive from purchasing the particular brand 
directly impacts the probability of purchase. Brands with a higher utility will have a 
higher probability of purchase. As both Xijt and li(τ) impact the probability of 
purchase and hence the utility, we include them as elements in the utility function 
(Heilman, Bowman and Wright 2000, Krishnamurthi and Raj 1991). We assume that 
the utility that a customer i obtains from purchasing product j is given by  
( )ijt ijt ij i ij ijtU X lβ τ α ε= + +         (2) 
ijtε  is assumed to follow an iid type-1 extreme value distribution. 
Therefore, the probability that customer ‘i’ purchases the product ‘j’ at time 
‘t’ in a particular loyalty state is given by:   
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           We assume a general functional form for the baseline hazard as given by 




0 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) lnit i it i it i it i it il l l t l t l tγ τ γ τ γ τ γ τ γ τ= + × ∆ + × ∆ + × ∆     (4) 
where ∆t is the time elapsed since the product was purchased. The baseline hazard 
function is a very general specification that nests most of the commonly used 
probability distributions for inter-purchase times. Vilcassim & Jain (1991) show that 
setting certain γ’s to zero allows the function to assume various distributions ranging 
from the Weibull, Exponential and the second order power series approximation of an 
Erlang-2 type distribution.  
We now proceed to model the likelihood function for the hazard model, which 
is given by: 
1
, ,( | , ( ), , ) ( ( , ( ), , )) (1 ( , ( ), , ))
δ δτ β α τ β α τ β α −= −∏ v vi iiH ijt ijt i ij ij j t ijt i ij ij j t ijt i ij ij
t
L Y X l h X l h X l       
(5) 
where Yijt is the choice made by the customer and 1vδ =  if a purchase 
occurred at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2 Modeling Loyalty Transitions 
 The second step in our analysis is to model the transitions of customer loyalty. 
The transitions are allowed to occur in either direction, i.e. in the direction of 
increasing or decreasing loyalty. In the state space equation li(τ+1) is the loyalty state 
in quarter τ +1, li(τ) is the loyalty state in quarter τ, and ( )η τi is the error term, 
assumed to be distributed N(0,Ω), where Ω is the variance of the prior distribution. 
We know from previous research (Johnson, Herrmann and Huber 2006, Yi and Jeon 




attitudes and behaviors towards the brand as well as firm level marketing variables, 
given by Xijτ, which could have an impact on the probability of purchase. ψ i  
measures the effect of Xijτ on the transition of loyalty from a state at time t to a state 
at time τ +1. We also assume a prior distribution for ψ i  given by pi(ψ i ). To capture 
the evolution of loyalty from one time period to another, we need to establish a link 
between loyalties across adjacent time periods. Hence we use a state space equation 
that allows us to model this link across adjacent time periods. We adapt the SSM 
model to our study by combining the generic model with the above mentioned set of 
covariates that we use to better understand customer loyalty. We call this model the 
SSMC (State Space Model with Covariates). 
The state space equation is then defined as follows: 
( 1) ( ) ( )ττ τ ψ η τ+ = + +i i ij i il l  X       (6), 
The likelihood function can then be written in the following manner, 
Li(li(1), li(2),.....,li(T)| , τψ i ijX ) = 
1
1
( (1)) ( ( 1) | ( ), , )
T





∏ +     (7) 
Hence the combined likelihood of the system of equations to predict both the 
probability of purchase and the loyalty state is given by multiplying equations (5) and 
(7): 
, ( ), ( | , ( ), , ) ,ii l h iH ijt ijt i ij ij i i i i i ijL L Y X l L (l (1), l (2),.....,l (T) | X ) τ ττ β α ψ= ⋅    (8) 
 
The likelihood function given in equation (7) has three components, namely, the 






3.3 The Bayesian Framework 
Combining the likelihood function given by equation (7) with the priors on iβ  
given by pi( iβ ), the prior on iα given by pi( iα ), the prior on ψ i given by pi(ψ i ) and 
the prior on li(τ), the loyalty state, given by pi(li(τ)), we obtain, by Bayes rule the joint 
posterior distribution for the hazard model, which is given by: 
ii i i i i i i i i i i i i,l ( ),h
p ( , l ( ), , | data) p ( ) p ( )p ( ) p ( ) L τβ τ α ψ β α ψ τ∝ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅il ( )                          (9) 
The priors for iβ , iα , ψ i  and li(τ) vary across customers as follows: 
pi( iβ ) ~ MVN(µ, ζ);                                                                                           (10) 
pi( iα ) ~ N(ω, χ);                                                                                                  (11) 
pi(ψ i ) ~ MVN(π, ξ);                                                                                             (12) 
µ ~ MVN(0,1.0); ζ ~ Gamma(1.0,1.0);                                                                 (13) 
ω ~ N(0,1.0); χ~ Gamma(1.0,1.0);                                                                       (14) 
π ~ MVN(0,1.0); ξ ~ Gamma(1.0,1.0);                                                                 (15) 
We draw the initial state prior for loyalty from a population wide distribution 
of loyalty. We assume that the mean of this distribution is 0 and the variance is 100I 
(where ‘I’ is the identity matrix) as we have no specific information about the 
variance of the distribution, implying an uninformative prior (uninformative due to 
the high numerical value of the variance). 
pi(li(1)) ~ N(0,100I)                                                                                           (16) 
4. Data and Estimation Procedure 
We obtained data from a leading manufacturer of beauty products. The 




is divided into two parts: a calibration dataset (also referred to simply as the dataset) 
and a validation dataset. The calibration dataset consists of purchases of 250,717 
customers over a period of 18 months. The validation dataset consists of purchase 
data on the same panel of customers who made purchases over the next 6 months. 
The firm has provided data on several variables including the date the customer was 
first included in the database, the dates the purchases were made, the amount spent 
per purchase, the different types of mailings that were sent and whether the 
customer’s email address and physical address was in the system. The company had 
provided data on 15 different types of mailings that were sent to the customers in the 
dataset. If a mailing was sent to the customer the value of the particular mailing 
variable was 1 and if a mailing was not sent then the value of the mailing variable 
was 0. We also calculate a cumulative mailings variable which is the sum total of all 
the different types of mailings sent to the customer. The average number of mailings 
sent out by the firm to a customer over the 18 months was 2.61. We then calculate the 
recency of purchase (the time since last purchase), the frequency with which 
purchases were made (the number of times the customer made a purchase at the store) 
and the monetary value of each purchase for each customer (the total dollar value of 
purchases made on each purchase occasion). Finally, we divide the data into three 
month intervals at τ=0, τ =1, τ =2, τ =3, τ =4, τ =5, and τ =6.  
Estimation is carried out using the MCMC procedure based on a Gibbs 
sampling scheme (Geman and Geman 1984). We approximate the posterior 
distribution as described in (9) by sampling from the full conditional distributions. 




loyalty states for each quarter and then we derive the estimates of the probability of 
purchase at the daily level. We ran 50000 iterations using the WinBUGS software 
package, where the first 40000 iterations were used for burn-in and the last 10000 
were used for estimation. We controlled for autocorrelation by thinning the 
observations-only every 4th observation was used for our estimation procedure. 
Finally we also checked for convergence by running two chains simultaneously and 
monitoring the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin (BGR) convergence diagnostic, where 
convergence is said to have been achieved if the BGR statistic for each chain 
approaches the value of unity. 
We estimate the two equations (3) and (6) using the following covariates.  
The repurchase equation (3) included the following covariates: monetary value of the 
purchase, whether the customer’s email address is available, whether the customer’s 
name and physical address are available, frequency of purchase, whether the purchase 
was made on a national holiday, the total number of mailings sent mailings, the 
recency of purchase, whether the visit was to return a previous purchase, and finally 
the predicted loyalty of the customer. The equation for predicted loyalty (6) includes 
the following covariates: the recency of purchase, monetary value of the purchase, 
frequency of purchase, and 15 variables that indicate whether the particular type of 
mailing was sent or not. These variables have a value of 1 if the mailing was sent and 
0 if they were not. The mailing variables included are: product mail1, product mail2, 
product mail3, product mail4, product mail5, product mail6, product mail6, product 
mail7, relationship mailing1, relationship mailing2, relationship mailing3, action 




5. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1a and 1b present the descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
dataset. Table 2 reports the posterior means and posterior standard deviations of the 
estimation procedure outlined in the preceding section. In figure 11 we see the 
distribution of the population wide loyalty function. The function is centered close to 
a mean of zero on the x-axis. An implication of this result is that on average 












              Figure 11: Population-wide distribution of the individual means of the 
loyalty function 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
   
Monetary Value 11.0881 15.63892 
Recency 543.9177 136.3432 
Frequency 3.001363 1.184601 
Mailings 2.612951 1.800003 
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics – Mean and Standard Deviation 
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Variable Value Frequency (%) 
   
Customer Email Address 1 24.86 
Customer Name & Address 1 79.87 
Product mail 1 1 4.02 
Product mail 2 1 43.78 
Product mail 3 1 5.87 
Product mail 4 1 11.13 
Product mail 5 1 2.36 
Product mail 6 1 7.05 
Product mail 7 1 4.59 
Product mail 8 1 4.41 
Relationship mailings 1 1 2.62 
Relationship mailings 2 1 4.87 
Relationship mailings 3 1 5.74 
Action mailings 1 1 7.63 
Action mailings 2 1 0.91 
Action mailings 3 1 3.53 
Action mailings 4 1 3.11 
Holiday 1 0.66 
   
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics – Frequency 
 
5.1 The Loyalty Equation 
 
The variables included in the analysis are presented in table 2. We see from 
the results that frequency of visits has a significant effect on loyalty of the customer 
towards the firm. We find that frequency has a positive effect on the customer’s 
loyalty, indicating that customers who visit the company store more often tend to be 
more loyal to the company’s products. Neither the recency of purchase nor the 
monetary value of purchase has a significant effect on the customer’s loyalty towards 
the firm. This result is of interest to firms because it implies that the amount a 
customer spends at a store on a given purchase occasion does not necessarily relate to 




We now examine the effect of the firm’s CRM interventions on the predicted 
loyalty of the customer. We segment the CRM interventions in the following way: 
 
1. Interventions that provide information about a specific product type or 
offering are classified as product mails. The variables in this category include: 
Product mailings 1 through 8. From the results shown in table 2, we find that a 
majority of the mailings that fall into this category have a significant effect on 
the loyalty of the customer towards the firm. Product mailings 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 
have significant positive effects on the loyalty of the customer to the firm. 
Mailings that are in this category provide information about the specific 
product, thereby arming the customer with knowledge about the firm’s 
product offerings. This helps reduce the information uncertainty that the 
customer has with respect to the firm’s products. This reduction in uncertainty 
also reduces the risk that the customer accepts when purchasing the firm’s 
products.  We hypothesize that this reduction in risk and increase in 
information available to customer help them make a more informed decision 
about the firm’s products and hence have a positive effect on the loyalty of the 
customer to the firm. Hence such mailings help in improving the loyalty of 
customer to the firm. 
 
2. Interventions that provide information about the entire suite of products 
offered by the firm in the form of a catalog can be classified as relationship 




mailing 1 through 3. Relationship mailings provide more social benefits (i.e., 
information on the product lines and lifestyle information) and focus on both 
relationship building and the creation of additional sales. These mailings tend 
to be more involved as they provide more information than just simple 
product mailings, and also include information on a much larger variety of 
product offerings. As they also involve greater customer participation, these 
mailings add towards strengthening the relationship between the customer and 
the firm. Hence we find that all the relationship mailings, 1, 2 and 3 are 
significant and have a positive effect on the loyalty of the customer to the 
firm. 
 
3. Finally, interventions sent at specific times of the year that are meant to 
prompt the customer to visit the store are referred to as action oriented mails. 
These mails are generally devoid of any information about a particular 
product or other offerings. The main purpose of such mailings is to remind the 
customer of the firm’s products and induce them to make a purchase. The 
mailings that fall into this category are:  action mailings 1 through 4. We find 
that of these mailings only action mailing 2 plays a significant towards 
improving the loyalty of the customer to the firm. These mailings are 
generally less involved than the other mailings described above, and their 
main purpose as mentioned before is to provide a quick increase in sales. 
Hence to a large extent these mailings would inspire feelings of opportunism 




that the customer makes in using these mailings is less than both relationship 
mailings and product mails. 
 
5.2 The Repurchase Equation 
 
The next step of our analysis involved estimating the repurchase equation. The 
parameter estimates are also given in table 2. We first analyze the effect of the three 
RFM variables, namely recency, frequency and monetary value, on the customer’s 
probability to repurchase. The estimates indicate that monetary value of purchase and 
frequency or purchase visits are most likely to have a significant effect on the 
probability that the customer comes back to the store to make a repeat purchase. The 
monetary value of a purchase has a negative effect on the likelihood of repurchase, 
i.e. the higher the monetary value of purchase, lower the probability of the customer 
coming back to the store. We also find that the frequency with which a customer 
makes a purchase visit has a positive effect on the likelihood of the customer 
repurchasing from the firm. 
Next we examine the effect of CRM interventions on the probability of 
repurchase. We model this variable as the cumulative total of all the different types of 
mailings received by the customer. We find that the total number of mailings received 
by the customer does in fact have a very strong positive effect on the probability of 
repurchase. Hence, the efforts undertaken by the firm to send out their CRM 




appropriate profit constraints, might even find it in its interest to increase the total 
number of CRM interventions sent out.  
Repurchase Equation    
 node Mean sd mean/s.d 
Monetary Value µ1 -0.05 0.007243 -6.90322 
Customer Email Address µ2 -0.02047 1.023 -0.02001 
Frequency µ3 0.3999 0.007179 55.73365 
Holiday µ4 2.14E-04 0.00817 0.026144 
Total Number of Mailings µ5 0.5002 0.007173 69.70584 
Recency µ6 -6.15E-05 0.00829 -0.00741 
Returns µ7 -2.30E-05 0.008258 -0.00279 
Customer Physical Address µ8 8.39E-05 0.008263 0.010156 
Predicted Loyalty µ9 0.02084 0.00702 2.968661 
     
Loyalty Equation    
 node Mean sd mean/s.d 
Frequency Ф1 4.67E-04 1.59E-04 2.939547 
Monetary Value Ф2 -9.05E-05 0.01098 -0.00824 
Product mail 1 Ф3a .990 0.1012 9.881423 
Product mail 2 Ф3c 1.001 0.1084 9.234317 
Product mail 3 Ф3f 1.09 0.09905 10.18677 
Product mail 4 Ф3g 1.02 0.09441 10.82512 
Product mail 5 Ф3h 0.007276 0.1048 0.069427 
Product mail 6 Ф3i 0.008962 0.09926 0.090288 
Product mail 7 Ф3k 1.006 0.09742 10.32642 
Product mail 8 Ф3n 1.658 2.149 0.771522 
Relationship mailings 1 Ф3j 1.112 0.1078 10.3154 
Relationship mailings 2 Ф3l 0.998 0.1004 9.940239 
Relationship mailings 3 Ф3m 1.007 0.1008 9.990079 
Action mailings 1 Ф3b -0.00332 0.09832 -0.0338 
Action mailings 2 Ф3d 1.021 0.09019 11.09879 
Action mailings 3 Ф3e 0.8881 0.5952 1.492103 
Action mailings 4 Ф3o 1.632 2.142 0.761905 
Recency Ф4 2.99E-05 0.00824 0.003625 
     
Table 2: Model Parameter Estimates 
 
 
We also find that predicted loyalty has a significant effect on the probability 
of repurchase. This effect is positive, implying that an increase in loyalty does in fact 




Hence, it would bode well for the firm to work towards increasing the loyalty of the 
customer towards its products. We have also shown in section 5.5.1 that certain CRM 
interventions like product mails and relationship mailings help improve the 
customer’s loyalty towards the firm. Thus the firm would do well to orient its CRM 
intervention schedule to include more of these types of mailings as they have been 
shown to improve loyalty and loyalty has in turn been shown to increase the 
probability that the customer would repurchase from the firm. 
Through our analysis we have shown that it is possible to infer a customer’s 
latent loyalty towards the firm and examine the effects of a firm’s CRM schedule on 
this derived loyalty function. We have also shown that the derived loyalty does in fact 
have a strong positive effect on the probability of the customer repurchasing from the 
same firm. Hence a firm can use these results to better design their CRM schedule. 
 
5.3 Model Validation 
 We validated our model’s results by comparing the prediction ability of our 
model to two additional models that are used in the literature to study relationship 
dynamics. We used the validation dataset to compare our predictions to those of the 
benchmark models that are described below. The first model estimated was the 
hidden Markov model (Netzer, Lattin and Srinivasan 2005) and the second model 
estimated was the loyalty model (Guadagni and Little 1983). Netzer, Lattin and 
Srinivasan (2005) show that the HMM is useful at estimating the relationship states of 
the customer and then predicting each customer’s probability of purchase. Therefore 




Additionally, the authors also state that the Guadagni and Little (1983) model 
was closest in terms of predictive ability to the results obtained from their model. 
Hence we chose the loyalty model as described by Guadagni and Little (1983) as our 
second benchmark model. The models are summarized below: 
 
Model 1: The first model we compared our predictions to was the hidden Markov 
model. We assumed that the customer transitions between three possible loyalty states 
namely: loyal, switcher and disloyal. The probability of transition between these 
loyalty states is modeled using a logit framework. Similar to the methodology 
adopted in our model, we assume that the mailing variables have an impact on the 
probability of transitioning from one state to another or remaining in the same state.  
Hence the transition probabilities are defined using the following function, where s is 
the state at time t, s’ is the state at time t+1 and ιits is the effect of the relationship 
encounter on the probability of transition between loyalty states and υss’ is the state 
specific threshold. The threshold is the value that the cumulative impact of the 
















l s s                                                                           (19) 
 
Model 2: In the second model, loyalty is modeled using the same formulation as that 
devised by Guadagni and Little (1983), where ρ is the decay parameter and purchaseit-
1 = 1 if customer ‘i’ made a purchase occurred in the previous period t-1. 
lit =ρlit-1 + (1-ρ)(purchase)it-1                                                             (20) 




Following the procedure employed by Netzer, Lattin and Srinivasan (2005) 
we used the RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Predicted Error) and validation log-
likelihood procedures to compare the predictive powers of the three models. The 
RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Predicted Error) measures the error between the 
predicted purchase probabilities and the actual purchases across customers and time. 
The validation log likelihood compares the predictive performance of the models. The 
results are shown in table 3. We can see from the results that the state space model 
results outperform those obtained from model 1 and 2.  
We also compared the differences in means between the repurchase 
predictions made by the three models. We checked for differences using a pairwise t-
test, the Bonferroni test and the Tukey test. The tests show that all the means are 
significantly different from each other. The results of the analysis are also presented 
in table 3. 
The SSMC model was also superior to the HMM in terms of computational 
efficiency. The HMM model took significantly longer time (almost twice the time) to 
achieve convergence than the SSMC. Additionally the SSMC spared the researcher 
from making any assumptions about the number of states that the customer could 
have. The continuous nature of the SSMC hence provided the researcher with a 
significant advantage over the HMM in terms of both the efficiency of the estimation 
procedure as well as the ability to avoid making assumptions about the relationship 





 Model SSMC HMM Loyalty Model 
RMSPE 0.3571 0.3703 0.3827 
Log Likelihood 80788 83434 85542 
 
Means Comparison t-value Significance 
Pairwise t-test of SSMC and HMM -79.181 <.0001 
Pairwise t-test of SSMC and Loyalty Model -84.733 <.0001 
 
Means Comparison  HMM Loyalty Model 
Bonferroni Test SSMC <.0001 <.0001 
Tukey Test SSMC <.0001 <.0001 
 
Table 3: Model Comparison Table – Comparing the Predictive Ability of the State 
Space Model with the Hidden Markov Model and the Loyalty Model 
Legend: SSMC – State Space Model with Covariates; HMM – Hidden Markov Model 
 
Model 2, while incorporating the importance of state dependence, only 
includes the effects of lagged loyalty on the loyalty state of the customer in current 
time period. Hence our model, which incorporates customer-firm interactions, allows 
additional insights on the effects of different CRM interventions and other variables 
of importance to the researcher on the current relationship state of the customer. 
 Hence from the validation tests carried out above we can see that the SSMC 
provides advantages over previous methods in terms of efficiency, better predictive 
ability and it also frees the researcher from making any assumptions about the 




 In this paper we used standard transaction data on customer purchase behavior 




Previous marketing literature solved problems of this type either by developing 
models that incorporate only state dependence, or using hidden Markov models. We 
develop a state space model to estimate the dynamics of relationships between the 
customer and the firm. The SSMC was estimated using a hierarchical Bayes MCMC 
procedure to account for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The main contribution of this research is the introduction of a new 
methodology to study the relationship dynamics between the customer and the firm, 
which helps manufacturers infer the underlying structure of relationship states. The 
researcher can dynamically classify customers into the relationship states, and assess 
the dynamic effect of interactions between the customer and the firm on the 
customer’s relationship state and consequent buying behavior. While the HMM can 
also achieve similar results, we show in section 5.3.2 that our model outperforms the 
HMM both in terms of its predictive ability as well as the efficiency with which 
convergence can be achieved. The number of states of the HMM determines the 
number of parameters that need to be estimated, as the researcher has to estimate a set 
of parameters for each individual state. On the other hand, the SSMC provides a 
major advantage in computational efficiency by allowing the researcher to derive a 
continuous probability distribution for the parameters across the states of the 
individual customer. Hence the number of parameters to be estimated no longer 
increases due to the continuous nature of the state space distribution.  
 An additional advantage of the SSMC over the HMM is that the researcher no 
longer needs to make an assumption about the number of states that the customer 




the most likely relationship state of the customer at a given point in time by simply 
studying the probability distribution of the customer at that time across all the 
possible states. 
 The empirical application of the SSMC model is demonstrated in sections 4 
and 5. From the results we can see the usefulness of the model in studying dynamic 
relationships. The results indicate that CRM interventions do play a role in shifting 
the customer from a state of lower loyalty to one of a higher loyalty. Specifically, we 
find that CRM interventions that belong to the product mail category and the 
relationship mailings category tend to have more of an impact on increasing the 
loyalty of the customer than interventions that are more action–oriented, i.e., those 
that incentivize the customer into making a purchase immediately through means of a 
coupon or sale.  
We also find that loyalty plays a positive and significant role in affecting the 
customer’s probability of repurchase. The higher the loyalty state of the customer, the 
greater is the probability of the customer coming back to the store to make a 
purchase. Hence using the SSMC we can test long term impact of the customer-firm 
interactions on the relationship between the customer and the firm.  
There are two main limitations of this study. Our dataset is comprised of only 
those customers who made a purchase in the time period we consider. Customers in 
the database who never purchased in the two year span were not included in the 
dataset. The exclusion of customers who never make a purchase from the dataset 
leads to a selection bias. Such biases can be controlled for by using an indicator 




lack of data on non-purchasers prevents us from doing so. Hence, due to the 
limitation of the dataset, the results derived must be weighted taking the selection bias 
into consideration.  
The second limitation arises because of the presence of endogeneity in the 
model. The endogeneity exists due to the fact that relationship mailings were sent 
only to customers who spent >$70 at the store. The problem therefore is that the 
marginal distribution of the relationship mailing variable is not independent of the 
conditional distribution of the loyalty variable given the relationship mailings. Hence 
the relationship mailings variable is endogenous, and this might lead to a bias in the 
estimates of the effect of relationship mailings on the loyalty of customer.   
  The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the use of a state space 
model to study customer – firm relationship dynamics and illustrate the advantage of 
using the state space model over methods prescribed in the previous literature. Hence 
our effort was mainly concentrated on using this method to study the customer 
relationship characteristics in order to deduce their loyalty states, taking into account 
various customer-firm interactions. To keep the model parsimonious we made 
simplifying assumptions with respect to the model parameters.  A richer dataset, 
which includes survey data on variables like customer satisfaction levels, would 
provide a better insight into variables that drive loyalty and provide an additional 
insight into the effect of these CRM interventions. The use of longitudinal survey data 
would be extremely beneficial in determining and shaping a customer’s loyalty state.  
Data on channels of purchase would also play an important role in shaping the loyalty 





Appendix 1: Solving for price and market share in logit demand models. 
Solving for price Pi  
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Taking exponentials on both sides of (f1) and then dividing both sides by α  we have, 
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It is hence easy to see that (h) is similar to equation (1) in the paper, hence the 
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Taking the natural logarithms on both sides of (i1) and using the result from equation 
(6) we have 
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which is the closed form solution of Pi independent of the effect of its own market 
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Solving for market share Sit 
To simplify notations, we replace 1 β+ i iC  with ‘δ’, 0β  with ‘∆’ and 0
1 β β− − +i iCe  with 
‘Ξ’. As previously noted, we still maintain the notation (1 ) α+ =ktUe . Thus 
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The equation in (p) is analogous to the result obtained in equation (14). Simply 
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